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RESEARCH PROJECT ABSTRACT
Problems of population settlement, urbanization, industrial development, technology advancement, and the depletion
and dissipation of the natural resources of Washington state have
initiated a variety of responses from the legislature in the form
of three major environmental statutes.

These ares the State En-

vironmental Policy Act, the Shoreline Management Act, and the
Environmental Coordination Procedures Act.

Together, these acts

constitute a unique legislative response among the states in
their attempt to channel development through environmental law.
It is the thesis of this case study that the legal ambit
of environmental management is the continuing interaction involving the legislative intent, administrative implementation,
and judicial interpretation of environmental law.
The purpose of this case study is to describe this
legal ambit by examining the acts themselves, their administrative guidelines, and a corpus of case arising from their implementation1 and to suggest a coordinated administrative scheme
whereby the intent of these three unique statutes can be more
fully realized.
The environmental impact statement was selected as
the coordinating vehicle.

The master application procedures

under the Environmental Coordination Procedures Act was selected
as the coordinating framework to process required impact statei

ii
ments and permits.
The concl usion of the study is that environmental
management is lacking a theoretical base for its decisions.
The evolution of administrative functions has progressed
from regulation, to allocation , and finally , to planning.
Who should receive the benefits of development and
order?

Who should pay the costs of development and order?

A theory of planning law needs to be related to the distribution of environmental amenities .
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PREFACE
"Some people have stated our supply
program is now inadequate, but I don't think
that's true," said the board president.
still adequate, only for a shorter time."

You see?

Nothing to worry about.

iv

"It's
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INTRODUCTION
The abundant natural resources of Washington are responsible for both the success of its economy and the quality
of li fe of its residents.

The state of Washington in the Paci-

fic Northwest is a leader, economically, in many ways.

Wash-

ington's agricultural sector, with its large production of
fruits, berries, and other crops places it first among the
states in apples, blueberries, red raspberries and hops, to mention but a few.

The state is among the top producers of pota-

t oes, winter wheat--it ranks third--pears, grapes, filberts,
and strawberries.
More than half of the state is in forests; one sixth of
the nation's standing sawtimber is in Washington.

Towering

Doublas firs and Ponderosa pines, western hemlocks, and red
cedar are among the commercially important trees.

Forests also

have a social value, they are useful as places of recreation,
watershed protection, and scenery .
Mineral and mineral related production is a major industry in the state.

Sand and gravel, silver, cement, zinc, and

lead are the most important products.

Large aluminum reduc-

tion plants, using refined ore from out-of-state and hydroelectric power have expanded.
United States total.

Aluminum output is 25% of the

Washington is the headquarters for the

world's largest producers of aircraft, the Boeing Airplane

2

Company.
The waters and shorelines of Washington are also important economic resources.

The commercial fishing catch--of

which salmon account for half the total, followed by halibut
and bottomfish--contributes significantly to the state's overall economy.

The Port of Seattle is the nation's fourth lar-

gest containerized shipping seaport.

Seattle is also a ma-

jor import-export center for the far east.1
Wa:ter.1.: as a resource is abundant, but competing, or po-

tentially competing claims, are placed on it for irrigational,
industrial, and recreational purposes, and energy production.
Washington has been noted for its abundant supplies of lowcost hydroelectric power.

Yet concern is growing over the in-

creased demand for energy within the region and from other regions.

Agriculture, aluminum reduction, aircraft production--

key industries in Washington--are highly energy-intensive.

With

few suitable sites for hydroelectric dams remaining, utilities
are turning their attention to thermal power plants, including
both coal-powered and nuclear-powered ones.

The environmental

and social costs and benefits associated with coal and nuclear
powered plants appear more difficult to assess and accept than
those accompanying hydro-electric power. 2
Thus, the natural
to its economy.

resou~ces

of the state are essential

But Washington's natural resources are equally

important as places of recreation, capable of rejuvenating the
body, and spirit--as its citizens, and visitors to the state,
will attest.

The diversity and splendor of Washington is

3
arguably, unequalled anywhere else in the world.
These differing, and often conflicting perspectives concerning the use of land are important.

Land development and eco-

nomic growth, historically, has been based on resource exploitation.

Land was perceived as a commodity, its use usually de-

termined by the economic laws of the free market, supply and demand.

Indeed, it was the federal government's policy in the

nineteenth century to dispose of land in promoting westward expansion. 3
A new sense of scarcity arose in this country with the
settling of the West.

This new perspective provided fertile

ground for the seeds of the conservation movement.

The percep-

tion of land underwent a transformation, from land as a commodity to land as a basic natural resource--its use to be determined
and managed by the government, for present and future citizens. 4
The task of reconciling these perspectives concerning the use
of land, and other basic natural resources, can be termed "environmental management."
The Washington state legislature has responded to these
conflicting perspective's over the use of the state's natural
resources with a unique set of environmental statutes.

This

paper is a case study of the three "major" environmental statutes
of Washington: the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA),5 the
Shoreline Management Act (SMA) ,6 and the Environmental Coordination Procedures Act (ECPA).7

The criteria of "major" is used

here to denote those ··· environmental statutes which have broad
(or possess the potential for broad) applicability--over develop-

4
ment in the state, and in governmental decision making i nvol ving actions which affect the environment.

These three statutes

were selected because they are the most expansive acts in terms
of legislative policy and administrative application.

As such,

they represent a substantial effort by the legislature to establish the consideration of environmental values as part of governmental decision making in Washington.

When considered together,

SEPA, SMA, and ECPA are singularly unique among the states, in
their attempt to channel development through environmental law.8
The concept of environmental management has been given
credence by these statutes of Washington which address the problems of population settlement, urbanization, industrial development, technology advancement, and degradation to the environment
and dissipation of natural resources,
The intent of this case study

rs

twofold: (1) Describe

the legal ambit of environmental management in Washington as
it pertains to the three selected environmental statutes; and,
(2) Suggest how ·these · statutes might be coordinated in order to
provide the participants in land development--the developers,
the public, and the administrative decision making body--with a
better process of gathering, analyzing, and evaluating environmental information.

The processing of environmental information

and the administration of a regulatory scheme are the major
functions of environmental management.
This case study can also contribute to the growing public
awareness regarding land development by indicating how citizens
are able to gain acce s s to the decision making process, and how

5
they may gain standing before the courts for the purpose of reviewing "environmental" decisions .
The legislature sets forth its decisions on basic policy
issues, the legislative intent.

The duty of carrying out the

legislative intent is delegated to the administrative body.

The

administrative body is authorized to implement the legislatiye
intent--as expressed in the three environmental statutes.

The

judiciary reviews conflicts arising out of the implementation
of the statutes in order to determine: the ascertainment of pertinent facts, the application of proper legal doctrines and rules,
compliance with the law, and an appropriate remedy in the case
at hand.

The judicial review provides us. with an interpreta-

tion of the law as enacted by the legislature and carried out
by the administrative body.
It is the thesis of this case study that the legal ambit
of environmental management is the continuing interaction involving the legislative intent, administrative implementation,
and judicial interpretation, of environmental law.
The scope of this study is generally confined to the
statutes themselves, their guidelines, and the corpus of case
law involving these statutes (as of this writing, ECPA does not
have a corpus of case law).

Telephone conservations with the

appropriate state agencies have been conducted in order to ensure the reliability of some of the secondary resource materials
used in this study.

An analysis and evaluation of the political

considerations accompanying the implementation of these statutes
is considered to lie beyond the purview of this case study.9
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The organization of the case study is as follows.

Chap-

ter One will discuss the legislative policies as expressed in
SEPA, SMA, and ECPA.

Primary attention will be given to those

sections which are vital to the implementation of the acts (as
clearly indicated by their inclusion in numerous court cases
or i n the coordinative scheme).

Those sections containing am-

biguous or conflicti ng language, which is given greater clarity
by judicial review, are also included.
Chapter Two presents a discussion of pertinent administrative guidelines established in order to implement the legislative intent of the three environmental statutes.

Again, sec-

tions that are emphasized are done so because they have proven
essential to a vigorous application of the acts or are included
in the proposed coordinative sbheme.
Chapter Three includes a corpus of case

law-~Washington

Superior Court, Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court--for

1973-1976.

These cases are presented chronologically so as to

allow us to discern how the legal ambit of environment management has evolved.

Two basic issues are particularly relevant to

environmental management which should be kept in mind: (1) What
evidence should be considered, and when, by the administrative
agency in making its decision? and, (2) Is that decision, and
subsequent administrative action, a proper exercise of its legal
authority?
Chapter Four presents an outline of the coordinative :
scheme, with ECPA providing the legal structure for political
participation, and the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as
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required under SEPA, and SMA, ip certain cases, 10 . functioning
as the coordinative vehicle.

A hypothetical proposal for develop-

ment will be posited and followed through the suggested coordinative scheme in order to examine how the system works.
In Chapter Five recommendations for further study regarding environmental law will be presented.

This chapter will

conclude with a brief discussion on economic growth, environmental law, and the changing role of government in contemporary
society.
Note:

In all cases where the underline is used, it is

for the author's purpose ·,of emphasis, except where otherwise
indicated.

CHAPTER ONE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The legislative intent of the three selected environmental statutes repres·e nts a unique response to resource use,
allocation, and preservation (particularly land and water) at
the state level.

In our democratic system of government, the

legislative intent of environmental policy is- the implicit
policy of the residents of the state.

As it will be seen in

chapter three, the legislative policy is especially important in
judicial review proceedings applying the "clearly erroneous"
standard.

When the court applies this review standard, the in-

tent of the legislature becomes part of the record by which the
court, using the policy as a guide, determines if the administrative body has carried out its duties in the public's interest.
State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA)
SEPA is an expression of the legislature's recognition
of the interrelationship between man and his environment.

It

especially notes the profound impact of man's activity on his
environment due to the influences of population growth, highdensi ty urbanization, industrial expansion, resource utilization
and exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances.1
One of the primary purposes of SEPA is to promote efforts which
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment. 2

The

legislature in SEPA declares that it is the continuing policy
8

9

of the state of Washington, in cooperation with federal and
local gover nments, and other concerned public and private organizations "to use all practicable means and measures • • • in a
manner calculated to:
(a ) Foster and promote the general welfare; (b) to create
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony; and (c) fulfill the social,
economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Washington citizens.J
Not only is it the policy of the state to merely maintain conditions of harmony, but those involved are to create
conditions of productive harmony, this appears to be an action
oriented mandate.

The responsibility of maintaining and crea-

ting this productive hannony, is to those of future generations
as well as the present orie,

The enviDonmental management frame-

work established takes on increasing importance as it is to continue in perpetuity.
The section designating what agencies are to be responsible for carrying out SEPA is all encompassing.

RCW 4J.21C.020-

(2) states this, and also what they are responsible for:
In order to car~y out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing responsibility of the state of
Washington and all agencies of the state to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of state policy, to improve and coordinate plans,
functions, programs, and resources t .o the end that the
state and its citizens may:
(a) Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation
as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
(b) Assure for all people of Washington safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(c) Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the
environment without , degradation,-r.lsk: to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
( d) Preserve important h.istoric, cultural, and natural
aspects of our national heritage;
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(e) Maintain, wherever possible, an environment which
supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(f) Achieve a balance between population and resource
use which will permit high standards of living and a
wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(g) Enhance the quality of renewable resources and
approach the maximum attainable recyling of depletable resources.
All agencies of the state are included as being responsible for
carrying out the lofty environmental policy.
unintended consequences" are to be
vironmental values are to be

~voided1

consi~ered

"Undesirable and
in other words, en-

to ensure the creation

and maintenance of healthful surroundings through deliberation,
not degradation by default.
Of particular interest in. the legislative declarations
is the apparent creation of an "environmental right" which is
extended to all people of the state: 4
The legislature recognizes that each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a health.f'ul _environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment. 5
This is a st·atutorily granted right, not a constitutional
one.

However the scope of substantive legal rights has been

given an expansive ambit by the Supreme Court in Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highwey Commission6 where the court held
that the procedural process of SEPA was created by the legislature to protect each person's "fundamental and inalienable right
to a healthful environment."

(This case is discussed · in .more de-

tail in chapter three, "Judicial Interpretation".)
The means by which the administrative body is to implement the legislative intent is outlined in 43.21co30, the proce-
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dural process.

Most of this section is presented below due to

its significance as an indication of how the government is to
protect the "environmental rights" of the people.

This section

is used by the court in order to determine the procedural correctness of

administratiV.~

decision making.

It reads as follows.

The legislature authorizes and directs that, to the filllest extent possible: (1) The policies, regulations, and
laws of the state of Washington shall be interpreted and
administered in accordance with the policies set forth
in this chapter, and (2) all branches of government of
this state, including state agencies, municipal and public corporations, and counties shall:
(a) Utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach
which will insure the integrated use of the natural and
social sciences and the environmental design arts in
planning and in decision making which may have an impact on man's environment;
(b) Identify and develop methods and procedures, in
consultation with the department of ecology and the
ecological commission, which will insure that presently
unquantified environmental amenities and values will be
given appropriate consideration in decision making al.ong
with economic and technical considerations;
(c) Include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses
of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement
of long-term productivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented;
(d) Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible official shall consult with and obtain the
comments of any public agency which has jurisdiction by
law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved • • •
(e) Study, develop, and descrive appropriate alternative uses of available resou·rces;

...

SEPA is patterned very closely upon the National Environ-
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mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 u.s.C.A. Sec. 4321 et seq.
A noteworthy difference is that while NEPA applies only to the
Federal government and its various departments and agencies,
SEPA applies to the state goverrunent plus all municipal and
public corporations and counties.

(SEPA, as originally pro-

posed, would only have included state agencies, but House amendments extended coverage ·. to local governments.

See Senate Jour-

nal, 1971 Ex. Sess., pp. 1808-1909.)
One of the major questions concerning the implementation of environmental policy occurs in 43.21c.030(2)(c):
What constitutes "major actions significantly affecting the
quality of the environment?", which requtre the preparation
and submission of an environmental impact statement (EIS).
Relevant EIS issues are: When should the EIS be prepared, that
is, at what stage in the development process should the EIS be
before the administrative agency?; What co_nsti tutes an "adequately" prepared EIS?; and, What evidence must be submitted by
an administrative agency in order to determine
the major action
the environment?

h~s

whether '~ or -.i not r: "l_

no significant impact on the quality 0£

The court cases involving the implementation

of SEPA, which is the subject of chapter three provide a response to these questions.
According to 43.21co90 the decision of the governmental
agency is to be accorded substantial weight in EIS matters:
In any action involving an attack on a determination by
a governmental agency relative to the requirement or
the absence of the requriement, or the adequacy of a "detailed sraatement", the decision of the government agency shall be accorded substantial weight.
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The legislature apparently intended to defer judgement to the
branch with "expertise" in EIS matters.

Also, as a practical

consideration, such a deferment would reduce the number of "administrative" cases appearing before the judiciary.
The time limitation for commencing a challenge to governmental action on grounds of noncompliance with the provisions of
SEPA must be commenced within sixty days for private party projects, or ninety days for projects to be performed by a governmental agency or to be performed under government contract.
Date of commencement begins with the filing of the notice with
the department of ecology (DOE), the date of final newspaper
publication, or date of mailing, whichever is later.

It should

l)e noted that:
Any subsequent action of the acting governmental agency for which the regulations of the acting governmental
agency permit the same detailed statement to be utilized and as long as there is no substantial change in
the project between the time of the action and any such
subsequent ac~ion, shall not be set aside, enjoined, reviewed, or thereafter challenged on the grounds of noncompliance with RC W 4J.21c.OJ0(2)(c).7
The legislative intent appears to be a desire to avoid, or at
least, mit i gate, bureaucratic redundancy in the preparation of
EISs.

Determinations of whether or not a "substantial change"

in the project has occured as those involving whether or not a
"major action significantly affects the quality of the environment" are usually made by the administrative agency. - Of course
if the determination is contested and brought before the court,
the judiciary has the final work on the matter.
In brief, SEPA is an environmental full disclosure sta-
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tute, requiring all agencies of the state to consider environmental values in their decision making and subsequenct actions.
SEPA created a Council on Environmental Policy (CEP) whose
primary responsibility was to "adopt initially and amend thereafter rules of interpretation and implementation" of the Act. 8
CEP was given rule making powers for the purpose of providing
guidelines to all branches of goverrunent.

Those guidelines are

discussed in the next chapter.
Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (SMA)
SMA is the legislature's recognition that the shorelines
of the state are among its most valuable and fragile of natural
resources.

Mounting pressures of competing uses for the shore-

lines has necessitated a concomitant increase in the coordination
of management and development of the shorelines of the state.
The legislature further finds:
T). hat much of the shorelines of t~e state and the uplands adjacent thereto are in private ownership; that
unrestricted conatruction on the privately owned or
publicly owned shorelines of the state is not in the
best vublic interestJ and therefore, coordinated planning is necessary in order to protect the public interest associated with the shorelines of the state
while, at the same time, recognizing and protecting
private property rights consistent with the public
interest. There is, therefor, a clear and urgent demand for a planned, rational, and concerted effort,
jointly performed by federal, state, and local governments, to prevent the inherent harm in an uncoordinated and piecemeal development of the state's shorelines. 9
SMA established statutory support for coordinated planning and
management between the state and local governments in order to
protect the public interest associated with the shorelines of

15
the state.

Unlike the provisions in SEPA, SMA expresses legisla-

tive acknowledgement of the potential conflict between private
property interests and the public interest.
this possible conflict in the use of

The res·o lution of

shoreline~,

is to come a-

bout through coordinated governmental planning.
While SEPA emphasizes the consequences of governmental
decision making on the environment, SMA focuses attention on the
management and development aspects of planning.
"use" oriented statute than SEPA.

SMA is a more

Development in SMA means

"a use consisting of the construction or alteration of sturctures • . • or any project of a permanent nature which materially interferes with the normal public use of the water or shorelines of the state."10
The legislative intent expressed in SMA is to provide
for the management of the shorelines "• . • by planning for and
fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses. • • and

by pro-

tecting against adverse effects to the public health, the land
and its vegetat-ion and wiJ.dlife ... 11
The legislature provides an ordering of preferential
uses which DOE is to adopt in establishing "shorelines of statewide significance )designated by the legislature and by statu. _.
tory procedural requirement), and which the local government is
to adopt in developing its master program.

The master program

is the comprehensive use plan for a described area.

The ordering

of preferential uses which are to be reflected in the implementation programs of DOE and local government indicate that environmental consideration are given priority over economic ones.
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Preferential uses are those which:
(1) Recognize and protect the state-wide interest
over local interest;
(2) Preserve the natural character of the shoreline;
(3) Result in long term over short term benefits;
(4) Protect the resource and ecology of the shoreline;
(5) Increase public access to publicly owned areas
of the shorelines;
(6) Increase recreational opportunities for the public
in the s~~reline;

...

The legislative intent of land use planning is to encourage those uses which are not dependent upon the shorelines
of the state to move inland.

In this way, SMA policy seeks to

mitigate the intensive demand for the shorelines of the state,
pertaining to development, so as to allow maximum access to
shorelines by t he people of

the .~ state.

The legislature is ex-

plicit in promoting a regulatory system which attempts to keep
the shorelines free of non-dependent uses:
In the implementation of this policy the public's
opportunity to enjoy the physical and aesthetic qualities of natural shorelines of the state shall be preserved to the greatest extent feasible consistent with
the overall best interest of the state and the people
generally. To this end uses shall be prefEfr-red. which
are consistent with control of pollution and prevention
of damage to the natural environment, or are unique to
or dependent upon the use of the state's shoreline • • •
Permitted uses in the shorelines of the state shall be
designed and conducted in a manner to minimize, insofar
as practical, any resultant damage to the ecology and
environment of the shoreline area and any interference
with the public's use of the water.13
The public's interest in the access to, and use of, the shorelines, is t he subject of legislative intent in SMA.

Even in

the provisions of the master program which allow for the varying of the application of use regulations of the program, the
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consideration of the public interest is promoted: "Any such
varying shall be allowed only if extraordinary circumstances
are shown and the public 'interest suffers no substantial detrimental effect. 1114 The question of what constitutes a substantial detrimental effect is not further defined.

In light of

SEPA, it may be assumed that a "varying action" which did not
have a substantial detrimental effect would require a negative
delcaration of significance (Washington Administrative Code (WAC)
197-10-.340 "Threshold Determination Procedures", discussed in
chapter two in more detail).
The administration of the development permit system to
manage shoreline use, "shall be performed exclusively by local
government ... 15 Sec. 90.58.180(1) provides that a person aggrieved
by an order of the local government concerning the granting or denying of a development permit may obtain a review in the superior court.

The DOE or the attorney general may obtain review of

any final order granting a permit, or granting or denying an application for a permit issued by a local government.16

Whereas

SEPA made no provision for court review, SMA makes it explicit
that all aspects of the regulatory system shall be reviewable
by the court 1 "Rules, re·gulations, designations, master programs, and guidelines shall be subject to review in superior
court. 111 7
A vigorous application of SMA is intended by the legislature in its direction to the courts to give the Act a liberal
construal: "This chapter is exempted from the rule of strict
construction, and it shall be liberally construed to give full
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effect to the objectives and purposes for which it was enacted. 1118
The overall intent of SMA is to recognize that coordinated, rational planning can prevent the "inherent harm in an uncoordinated and piecemeal development " of the state's shorelines.
Environmental Coordination Procedures Act of 1973 (ECPA)
The primary legislative intent of ECPA is twofold: (1 )
Reduce the numerous perm i ts and related documents required for
project approval from state and local agencies; and (2) Provide the public with a better access in expressing its views in
relation to applications to state and local agencies.

The legi-

slative purposes of ECPA are provided below and they -a r e · to be
considered the criteria for evaluating the effectivness of the
suggested coordinative scheme posited in chapter four.

The pur-

poses of ECPA are to:
(a) Provide for an optional procedure to assist those
who, in the course of satisfying the requirement s of
state government prior to undertaking a project which
contemplates the use of the state's air, land, or water
resources, must obtain a number of permits, from the department of ecology and one or more state or local agencies by establishing a mechanism in state government
which will coordinate administrative decision-making
procedures. • • pertaining to such documents.
(b) Provide to members of the public a better and
easier opportunity to present their views comprehensively on proposed uses of natural resource and related
environmental matters prior to the making of decisions • . .
(c) Provide to members of the public who desire to carry out • . • projects within the state of Washington a
greater degree of certainty in terms of permit requirements of state and local government.
(d) Provide better coordination and understanding between state and local agencies in the administration of
the various programs relating to air, water, and land resources.
• • .19
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It must be under scored that ECPA is an optional procedure, and
as such, lacks the force as contained in SEPA and SMA.
The optional nature of ECPA is again indicated in 90.62.404( 1):

'~ Any

person proposing a project may submit a master ap-

plication to the department

[poE] requesting

the issuance of all

permits necessary prior to the construction and operation of
the project in the state of Washington."
ECPA is a state permit system, where permit is "any li-:
cense, permit, certificate, certification·, approval, commpliance .
schedule, or other similar document pertaining to any regulatory
or management program"20 which contemplates the use of the state's
resources, that is required to be obtained
ting or operating a project.

prior to constriic-

SMA has a bearing on ECPA as permit

also means a substantial development permit under SMA, and "any
permit, required by a local goverrunent for a project, that

th~

local government has chosen to process pursuant to SMA. 21
11

Project under ECPA is "any new activity or any expansion of or
addition to an existing activity, fixed in location."22
ECPA has provisionrs " f.orsapublic hearing where the applicant may submit "any relevant information and material in support
of his applications, and members of the public may present relevant views and supporting materials in relation to any or all of
the applications being considered ... 23
As of this writing, there is no corpus of case law under ECPA but the act does provide that the "pollution control
hearings board" is authorized to review decisions· issued by
DOE except 'when:., a substantial developrrrent permit is under con-

20
sideration, where the shorelines hearings board created under
SMA, RCW 90.58 ,. 170, has authority for review.

Administrative

review under ECPA is confined to the restrictive standards for
judicial review as set out by the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) RCW 34.04.130(5), and neither Board . has power to review the
facts de novo because APA sec. 130(5) limits review to the record
below, except in cases of procedural irregularity.

Judicial re-

view under ECPA is governed by APA in contested cases and limits
the reviewing body's discretion to the reversal of the administrative decision if, inter alia, it is "unsupported by material
and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or

...

arbitrary and capricious."24

The guidelines governing the master· application procedure
will be presented in the next chapter.

But the optional nature

of ECPA is the biggest obstacle in the act actually functioning
as a coordinative mechanism.

The potential for an effective

permit process system has been established by the legislature.
Considered together, SEPA, SMA, and ECPA provide the
necessary statutory framework in which the proposaJsfor development can be channeled through a structure of environmental law.
The administrative implementation aspect of environmental management is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO
ADMI NISTRAT I VE IMPLEMENTATION
The purpose of administrative implementation is to carry
out the intent of the legislature as the administrative agency
has been so authorized to do.

I n providing the legal means of

carrying out the intent of the legislative branch of government, it becomes necessary for the administrative branch to
establish a system of guidelines interpreting and implementing
the legislative act.
Guidelines Interpreting and Implementing SEPA
In 1974; the Washington State Legislature established
a new agency, the Council on Environmental Policy (CEP), and
charged it with the responsibility for adopting "rules of interpretation and implementation" of SEPA.

After extensive

drafting and public hearings, CEP adopted final SEPA guidelines
on December 12, 1975.

These guidelines became effective Janu-

ary 15, 1976.
As directed by the Legislature, CEP ceased to exist and
its duties were transferred to the Department of Ecology (DOE)
I

on July 1, 1976.

After many petitions for change and several

meetings and public hearings; DOE adopted guidelines amendments
in December, 1977. These became effective on January 21,1978. 1
The pertinent issues concerning the implementation of
SEPA and the guidelines are: authority to establish guide l ines,
21

22

purpose, scope , and coverage, definitions of action where the
preparation of an EIS might be involved, timing of the EIS process, scope of a proposal and·-·relation to EIS, threshold determination, EIS preparation responsibility, and the major elements of a draft EIS.

This section will end with a discussion

of the rules of judicial review applicable to the implementation
of SEPA.
The authority to promulgate SEPA guidelines was granted
in RCW 43.21c.110, in which the legislature stated that it would
be the duty of the Council "To adopt initially and amend thereafter rules of interpretation and implementation."
The purpose of the guidelines is twofold• (1) To establish guidelines interpreting and impoementing SEPA.

Each

state and local agency of government must adopt its own rules,
ordinances or resulutions consistent with Chapter 197-10 Washington Administrative Code (WAC), "Guidelines Interpreting and
Implementing the State Environmental Policy Act".

And (2) To

establish methods and means of implementing SEPA in a manner
which reduces duplicative and wasteful practices,

es~ablishes

effective and uniform procedures, encourages public involvement,
and promotes certainty with respect to the requirements of the
act. 2 (Note the similarity in language with the purpose of ECPA.)
The guidelines are important in a legal sense in that
compliance with the guidelines of Chapter 197-10 WAC and agency
guidelines consistent therewith, "shall constitute complete procedural compliance with SEPA for any 'action' as defined in WAC
197-10-040(2)."

Thus, the guidelines are used by the court in
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the judicial review of actions relating to the implementation of
SEPA.
According to WAC 197-10-040(2), "action" means:
(2) [Al n activity potentially subject to the environmental impact statement requirements of RCW 4J.21C.OJ0(2) (c) and (2)(d) • • • All actions fall within one of
the following categories:
(a) Governmental licensing of activities involving modification of the physical environment.
(b) Governmental action of a project nature. This includes and is limited to:
(i) the decision by an agency to undertake any activity which will directly modify the physical environment,
whether such activity will be undertaken directly by the
agency or through contract with another, and
(ii) the decision to purchase, sell, lease, transfer
or exchange natural resources, including publicly owned
land, whether or not the environment is directly modified.
(c) Governmental action of a nonproject nature. This
includes and is limited to:
(i) the adoption or amendment of legislation, ordinances, rule s or regulations which contain standards contolling use or modification of the physical environment;
(ii) the adoption or amendment of comprehensive land
use plans or zoning ordinances;
(iii) the adoption of any policy, plan or program
which will govern the development of a series of func~ ~
tionally related major actions, but not including any
policy, plan or program for which approval must be obtained from any federal agency prior to implementation;
(iv) creation of, or annexations to, any city, town,
or district;
(v) adoptions or approval of ut i lity , transportation
and solid waste disposal rates;
(vi) capital budgets; and
(vii) road, street and highway plans.
As is evident, the extent of governmental activity which is subject to the provisions of SEPA is indeed expansive.

While the

listing of "categorical exemptions" in WAC 197-10-170 are too
numerous to mention, it should be noted that (6) under said section exempts the "activities of the legislature.

All action of

the state legislature are hereby exempteds Provided, That this
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subsection shall not be construed to exempt t he propos i ng of
legislation by any agency."
The guidelines defining "action", it should be emphasized, became effective subsequent to the court cases discussed
in chapter three.

As is clear in that discussion, many of the

questions concerning what constitutes an "action" have been resolved in the most recent set of guidelines.

This is in keeping

with the purpose of the guidelines, promoting "certainty with
respect to the requirements of the act."
The timing of the EIS process is an essential element of
the guidelines.

The vigorous application of SEPA is dependent

upon the consideration of environmental values, and the EIS represents the principal means of identifying and examining those
values.

WAC 197-10-055 states:
(1) The primary purpose of the EIS process is to provide environmental information to governmental decisionmakers to be considered prior to making their decision.
The process should thus be completed before the decisions
of an agency commit it to a particular course of action.
The actual decision to proceed with many actions may involve a series of individual approvals or decisions.
The threshold determination and the EIS, if required,
should ideally be completed at the beginning of the
process. In many cases, however preliminary decisions
must be made upon a proposal before the proposal is sufficiently definite to permit meaningful environmental
analysis. All agencies shall identify the times at
whieh the EIS process must be completed either in their
guidelines or ·on a case by base basis. The lead agency
should require completion of the threshold determ i nation
and EIS, if required, at the earliest point in the planning and decision-making process when the principal features of a proposal and its impacts upon the environment
can be reliably identified.
(2) At a minimum, the thr.eshold determination and any
required EIS shall be completed prior to undertaking any
proposed major action.
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The difficulty in the EIS process is that numerous decisions
must be made upon a proposal before there is available, adequate boundaries of the impact of the project.

The notion of

when an impact upon the environment can be "reliably" :..identified
is a judgement by the administrative agency, which is open to potentially conflicting interpretations by the developer, the public,
and the court, if the decision is contested and brought before
the court for review.

(The court has held that an administrative

decison on the impact of a rezoning action--no EIS required-could be changed once, at a later time, additional information
was made available which would define the proposal with more
clarity, see Narrowsview v. Tacoma, chapter three.)
The scope of a proposal and how extensive an EIS must be
in its assessment of impact is a recurring question.

Often, pro-

jects have been divided up, "segmented" by those hoping to avoid
EI S requirements.

Future governmental approvals are often re- · ··

quired, and thus, might require an EIS, by one agency, but not
by the lead agency.

WAC 197-10-060 addresses these problems:

(2) The total proposal is the proposed action, together with all proposed activity functionally related
to it. Future activities are functionally related to the
present proposal if;
(a) The future activity is an expansion of the present proposal, facilitates or is necessary to operation
of the present proposal; or
(b) The present proposal facilitates or is a necessary prerequisite to future activities.
The scope of the proposal is not limited by the jurisdiction of the lead agency. The fact that future parts
of a proposal will require future governmental approvals
shall not be a bar to their present consideration, so
long as the plans for those future parts are specific
enough to allow some evaluation of their potential environmental impacts. Acting agencies and lead agencies should be alert to the possibility that a pro-
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posal may involve other agencies with jurisdiction
which may not be taking any action until sometime in
the future.
(For example, in a proposal ·ror a plat approval, another agency
with jurisdiction may be the appropriate sewer district, even
though the sewers may not be installed until several years later.)
Subsections 197-10-060(3) and (4) address the extent of
EIS assessment and "segmentation" respectively:

(3) The impacts of proposal include its direct impacts as well as its reasonably anticipated indirect
impacts. Indirect impacts are those which result from
any activity which is induced by a proposal. These include, but are not limited to impacts resulting from
growth induced by the proposal, or the likelihood that
the present action will serve as a precedent for future
actions. Contemporaneous or subsequent development of
a similar nature, however, need not be considered in the
threshold determination unless there will be some causal
connection between this development and one or more of
the governmental decisions necessary for the proposal in
question.
(4) The lead agency may divide proposals involving extensive future actions into segments, with an EIS prepared for each segment. In such event, the earlier EIS
shall describe the later segments of the proposal and
note that future environmental analysis will be required
for these future segments. The segmentation allowed by
this subsection shall not be used at the threshold determination stage to determine that any segment of a
more extensive significant is insignificant • • •
A lead agency cannot segment a proposed project in order to
reduce its significance.
tically.

A proposal is to be considered holis-

Indirect impacts which should be included in an EIS

are those which may be growth-inducing, such as the adoption of
a zoning ordinance which will encourage or tend to cause particular types of projects.

A project, such as the construction

of a condominium, to be located in an area of single family dwel-

27

ling, would constitute a significant change in the area.

Thus,

the adoption of a zoning ordinance allowing the project to proceed would be within the guidelines requiring the preparation of
an EIS.
The reamining EI S issue to be considered before a brief
listing of the contents of the EI S is given, is the critical
one: whether or not the proposal will result in a significant
adverse impact upon the quality of the environment.

The guide-

lines recognize that when several marg inal impacts are taken together, this could result in a significant adverse environmental
impact.J

The guidelines make it explicit that the determination

of whether or not an EIS is required, is not merely a matter of
w.eighing the benefits and detriments of the proposal.
more expansive in their language.

They are

WAC 197-10-360(3) read:

It $pQuld also be remembered that proposal designed
to improve the environment (such as sewage treatment
plants or pollution control requirements) may also
have adverse environmental impacts . The question at
the threshold determination level is not, whether the
beneficial aspects of a proposal outweigh its adverse
impacts, but rather if the proposal involves any significant adverse impacts upon the quality ' of the environment. If it does, an EIS is required. No test
of balance shall be applied at the threshold determination level.
It is interesting to compare t he above language wi th that of the
act its.elf, in which no mention is made of "adverse" impacts.
Only if a major action significantly affected the quality of
the environment, would an EIS be required.

However,

accor~ing

to the guidelines, any significant adverse impact requires an
EIS.

I t seems in determining whether or not a proposal would

have an adverse, rather than merely a significant, impact,
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some weighing of benefits and detriments is necessary.
The preparation of the EIS may be done by a private applicant or his agent, or by an outside consultant retained by either
a private applicant or the lean agency.

Nevertheless, the assur-

ance that the EIS is prepared in a responsible manner and with
appropriate methodOl.ogy is the responsibility of the official
within the lead agency.

"The responsible official shall direct

the areas of research and examination to be undertaken, as well
as the organization of the resulting document."4
The two principal elements in the EIS are the summary of
the contents and eight subelement:s which constitute the major part
of the text.

The summary if often used by agencies other than

the lead agency as an aid in

deoiit~'O.n'r.tnak.tng.

If the impacts can-

not be predicted with certainty, the reason for uncertainty
gether with the
stated.5

more ~ likely

to~ .

possibilities are to be concisely

The summary is to include a brief description of the

following:
(a) The proposal, including the purpose or objectives
which are sought to be achieVied by the sponsor.
(b) The direct and indirect impacts upon the environment which may result from the proposal.
(c) The alternatvies considered, together with any
variation in impacts which may result from each alternative.
(d) Measures which may be effected by the applicant,
lead agency, or other · agency with jurisdiction to mitigate or eliminate adverse impacts which may result from
the proposal •
. (e) Any remaining adverse impacts which cannot or will
not be mitigated.o

.

The eight sections which comprise the major part of the
EIS are to describe: the name and location of the proposal: existing environmental conditions: the impact of the proposal on the
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envirorunent; the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity; irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources; adverse envirorunental impacts which may be mitigated;
alternatives to the proposal; and, unavoidable adverse impacts.?
Generally, these sections reflect the legislative intent expressed
in SEPA regarding how the policies of SEFA are to be implemented.8
Rules and guidelines adopted pursuant to SEPA are to be
in accordance to, and subject to, the scope of judicial review,
as expressed in the Administrative Procedure Act, (APA)(RCW J4.-

o4.120 and J4.1JO.

Sec. 120 reads: "Every decision and order

adverse to a party to the proceeding, rendered by an agency in
a contested case, shall be in writing or stated in the record
and shall be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusion of
law."
Sec. 130 of the APA describes the scope of judicial review which the court applies in examining administrative decisions:

(6) The court may affirm the decision of the agency
or remand the case for further proceeding; or it may
reverse the decision if the substantial rights of the
petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the agency; or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as
submitted and the public policy contained in the act of
the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious.
The "clearly erroneous" standard of review entitles the court to

JO
review with the most expansive la ti tu de, the decision of the agency ' involved in a contested case.

The "clearly erroneous" stan-

dard can be applied when it is necessary to determine the consistency between the legislative intent of the act and the means
of implementing that intent as performed by the administrative
agency in question.
Guidelines Implementing SMA
The legislature has recognized that the shorelines of the
state are a valuable and fragile resource.
a limited asset.

Moreoever, they are

They cannot be increased but there exists the

possibility that their value will diminish without a sound . and
comprehensive management program.
Ther~

are three chapters of the Washington Administrative

Code providing guidelines to carry out the intent of SMA which
is to provide for the management of Washington's shorelines by
planning for and fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses.
These are: "Final Guidelines" implementing SMA, WAC 173-16: "Permits for Substantial Development on Shorelines of the State",
WAC 173-14; and, "Adoption of Designations of Wetlands Associated with Shorelines of the State:, WAC 173-22.
As required by SMA9 the final guidelines are to: "Serve
as standards for implementation of the policy of chapter 90.58
RCW for regulation of uses of the shorelines; and, Provide criteria to local governments and the department of ecology in developing master programs."lO

The three parts of the SMA guide-

lines to be discussed are: the Master Program, the Natural Sy-
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stems, and, the Use Activities.
The local government is to develop the master program
in order to provide an objective guide for regulating the use of
shorelines.

The master program should indicate the local poli-

cies for the development of shorelands and state how these policies relate to the goals of the local citizens and to specific
regulations of uses affecting the physical development of land
and water resources throughout the local government's jurisdiction.

The master program is general, comprehensive, and long

range in nature.

The policies, proposals, and guidelines are

not directed toward any specific sites and are to include all
land and water uses, their impact on the environment, and logical estimates of future growth.11
The local governments submit a master program to DOE;
it "must contain a clearly expressed policy statement.

The

pol i cy statement must reflect the intent of the act, the goals
I

of the local citizens, and specificall y relate the shoreline
management goals to the master program use regulations.

The

methodology for developing policy statements require local
government to:
(a) Obtain a broad citizen input in developing policy by involving interested citizens and all private and
public entities having interest or responsibilities relating to shorelines • • •
(b) Analyze existing policies to identify those po licies that may be incorporated into the master program and those which conflict with the intent of the
act • • •
(c) Formulate goals for the use of shoreline areas
and develop policies to guide shoreland activities to
achieve these goals.12
Although the local governments provide their own specific
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guidelines to reflect the varying differences of shorelines
throughout the state, the master program guidelines require
the inclusion of several plan elements.

These are:

(a) "Economic development element" for the location
and design of industries, transportation facilities, port
facilities, tourist facilities, commercial and other developments that are particularly dependent on shoreland
locations.
(b) "Public access elements" for assessing the need
for providing public access to shoreline areas.
(c) "Circulation element" for assessing to location and extent of existing and proposed • • . transportation routes and other public facilities and correlating those facilities with the shoreline use elements.
(d) "Recreational element" for the preservation and
expansion of recreational opportunities through programs
of acquisition, development 'and various means of lessthan-fee acquisitQon.
(e) "Shoreline use element" for considering:
(i) The pattern of distribution and location requirements of land uses on shorelines and adjacent areas, including, but not limited to, housing, commerce, industry,
transportation, public buildings and utilities, agriculture, education and natural resources.
(ii) The pattern of distribution and location requirements of water uses including, but not limited to, aquaculture, recreation and transportation.
(f) "Conservation element" for the preservation of the
natural shoreline resources, considering such characteristics as scenic vistas, parkways, estuarine areas for fish
and wildlife protection, beaches and other valuable natural or aesthetic features.
( g) "Historical /cultural element" for protection and
restoration of buildings, sites and areas havi~g historic, cultural, education or scientific values.19
Of interest is the provision in the "economic development element" requiring the location of developments on shoreland locations to be "particularly dependent" on shoreland locations.
This isnor:EiSten't with the intent of SMA of allowing "alterations
of the natural condition of the shorelines • • • when

autho~ized,

shall be given priority for • • • industrial and commercial developments which are particulariy dependent on their location
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on or use of the shorelines."14
The Natural Systems part of the guidelines is intended
to provide criteria to local governments in the development of
their master program.

The natural systems categories include

marine beaches, spits and bars, islands, estuaries, marshes,
bogs and swamps, lakes rivers, streams and creeks, flood plains,
Puget Sound , and the Pacific Ocean.

Perhaps the natural sy-

stem subject to the most intensive of competing demands is the
Puget Sound.
Essentially the criteria provide a description of the
natural system along with the reaons why it must be managed
properly.

An example of the guidelines description of "estu-·

aries" is as follows1
An estuary is that portion of a coastal stream influenced by the tide of the marin~ waters into which it
flows and within which the sea water is measurably diluted with freshwater derived from land drainage.
Estuaries are zones of ecological transition between
f~esh and saltwater.
The coastal brackes water areas
are rich in aquatic life. • ·• Because of their importance in the food protection chain and their natural
beauty, the limited estuarial areas require careful
attention in the planning function. Close scruting
should be given to all plans for development in estuaries which reduce the area of the estuary and interfere with water flow. (See WAC 173-16-060(14))
Special attention should be given to plans for upstream projects which could deplete the freshwater
supply of the estuary.15
The holistic systems approach to shoreland planning is evident
here.

The other section referred to, deals with ."landfill" uses

on the shorelines.

In keeping with the policy of SMA, it is

noted that most landfills destroy the natural character of the
land, and therefore "Priority should be given to landfills for

J4
water-dependent uses and for public uses."
The economic development of the central Puget Sound
Basin has been stimulated by the fact that the Sound is one of
the few areas in the world which provides several deepwater inland harbo r s (Everett, Seattle, Tacoma, Bellingham).

The use of

the Puget Sound waters by deep-draft vessels is on the increase
due to its proximity to the developing Asian countries.

Too,

the northern Puget Sound is the site of the oil docking facilities receiving oil from the Alaskan North Slope (along with
southern California).

This increased trade +'B.:fu.cP docking will

attract more industry and more people which will place more use
pressure on the Sound in terms of recreation and the requirements for increased food supply.

A vigorous application of

of guidelines is essential so as to allow the shorelines of
the state to be enjoyed by future generations.
The Use Activities sections contains guidelines which
represent the criteria upon which judgements for proposed shoreline developments are to be based until the master programs have
been completed; and, these guidelines are intended "to provide
the basis for the development of that portion of the master program concerned with the regulation of such uses. 11 1~ .:.·· Since ~ alr
of the master programs have been completed

the · ~se

acticities

have been incorporated into the local government's regulatory
system.

The : categories of use activities are: agricultural prac-

tices, aquaculture, forest management practices, commercial development, marinas, mining, outdoor advertising, signs, and billboards,
residential development, utilities, ports and water-related indus-
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try, bulkheads, breadwaters, jetties and gro i ns, landfill, solid
waste disposal, dredging, shoreline protection, road and ra i lroad
design and construction, piers, archeological areas and historic
areas, and recreation.

In general, the use categories encourage

protect i on of the shorelines where possible, promote public access to shorelands, restrict where possible, development which
is particularly dependent on the shoreline for its location and
operat i on, and to reduce where practicable, the adverse impact
to the environment due to development. 1 7
And lastly, the guidelines mentions the variances and
conditional use .. consideration that are to be included in the
local master program.

Any permit for a variance or a conditional

use granted by the local government under an approved master program must be submitted to the DOE for approval or disapproval.
The guidelines state that the granting of variances and conditional uses ''should be utilized in a manner which, while protecting the environment, will assure that a person will be able
to utilize his property in a fair and equitable ·manner. 18
11

This

is an attempt by the administrati'11e body to avoid the "taking
issue" in the regulation of uses on the state's shorelands.
The permit system for "substantial developments" on the
shorelines is administered the local government with t.he DOE
acting primarily in a supportive and review capacity with "primary emphasis on insuring compliance with the policies and provisions of the shoreline management act . .. 19

A substantial de-

velopment is any "development which the total cost or fair market value exceeds one thousand dollars, or any development
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which materially interferes with the normal public use of t he
water or shorelines of the state. • • ..20
I n the regulation pertaining to "Permits for Substantial Developments on Shorelines of the State", Sec. 173-14-100
WAC, statESSBPA has been determined to be applicable to government permit programs.

Thus, all the SEPA guidelines previously

mentioned in this chapter pertai n to the granting or denying of
permits for substantial development.

This is an important fact

to bear in mind as the suggest coordinative scheme posited in
chapter four uses SEPA's procedural process where the ' EIS is
required as the coordinating vehicle.

However, an unresolved

question is whether the Shorelines Hearings Board, in reviewing a SMA permit, has the authority to invalidate the permit
on grounds of noncompliance with SEPA.2 1
In the "Adoption of Designations of Wetlands Associated with Shorelines of the State" the designations are in the
form of three volumes of maps incorporated in an appendix.

Re-

levant to the section in SMA authorizing the DOE to designate
'wetlands 1122 is the definition of "wetlands" in the Designation
guideline, 173-22-030 WAC:
(1) "Wetlands" or "wetland areas" means those land
extending landward for two hundred feet in all directions
as measured on a horizaontal plane from the ordinary h~gh
water mark; and all marshes, bogs, swamps, flaodways, river ·deltas and flood plains associated with the streams,
lakes and tidal waters which _are subject to the provisions of chapter 90.58 RCW.
(2) "Associated wetlands" means those wetlands which
are strongly influenced by and in close proximit¥ to any
stream, river, lake, or tidal water, or combination thereof, subject to chapter 90.58 RCW.
~f

the map designations conflict with the criteria, the latter
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control (WAC 173-22-055(1973).

Generally the court will defer

to the judgement of DOE in interpretative matters, as it is the
administrative agency with the technical expertise needed to designate wetlands and associated wetlands.
Master Application Procedu+es (ECPA)
All ECPA master applications are processed through · the administrative headquarters located at DOE in Olympia, the state
capitol.

The master application center is operated by DOE inde-

pendently of the department's other programs and administrative
offices. pursuant to Chapter 173-08 WAC.
When the center receives a completed master application
form, the center forwards copies to all participating agencies .
(those involved in processing permits pursuant to the procedures
of EPCA).

At the same time, the center sends a certification ·

form to the local government where the proposed activity is to
occur.

Th~

certification form is to indicate one of the following:

(i) The proposal complies with all zoning ordinances
and associated comprehensive plans and relevant policies
administered by the local government relating to the location of the proposal. Therefore, certification is issueds
(ii) Local government has no applicable zoning ordinances or comprehensive plans and relevant policies in
effect for the subject area. Therefore, certification
is issued;
(iii) The proposal does not comply with either local
governments zoning ordinances, associated comprehensive
plans or relenat policies in effect for the subject area.
Local government elects to process according to this chapter the necessary to certify this proposal•
(iv) The proposal does not comply with either local
governments zoning ordinances, associated comprehensive
plans or relevant policies in effect for the subject
area. Local government does not elect to process according to this chapter the permits necessary to certify
this proposal. Therefore, certification is not issued 22
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As indicated in (iii) above, the local government

~ecomes

a par-

ticipating agency in the permit process only if the proposal does
not comply with the required stipulations.

No environmental

assessment (under SEPA) is required by ECPA before the local
government makes a determination an the proposal.

This is im-

portant, since the local government's decision not to issue the
certification will terminate the application procedure.23
A participating state agency is required to send the
center a statement indicating whether or not it has an interest
in the proposal, pertaining tos
permits, juriso~ctions, or interests including any information and data needed in addition to that provided
in the application;

val~~)i~h~~~:rd~~i~~tt~eP~~!~~l~e~~~~Icw~~~~r::t~~4

A participating state agency would have a better opportunity
of assessing the public interest, as well as jurisdiction boundaries, if an environmental assessment of the project were
available.
During this time the center is also to "carefully evaluate the project's scope and all interests involved, including
overall public interest, to determine if a public hearing is
needed."

25
Once the center receives the requested\ · information from

participating agencies, it sends this to the applicant and verifies compliance with SEPA.

If this is not already accomplished,

the center sends an environmental checklist to the applicant for
completion.

After receiving the applications, and, if needed,

the environmental checklist, the center forwards these to the
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participating agencies and identifies the SEPA lead agency
(pursuant to WAC 197-10-230(6)) and notifies the agencies of
this.26
Timing considerations of SEPA--predraft consulation requests (if requested by the applicant), preparing the draft environmental impact statement (if required), and scheduling requirements of local boards, commission and councils--are required tQ!.b coordinated with the publication of notice of the
master application.27
The need for a public hearing is determined by the center, or any agency reviewing a given master application , after
considering overallpublic interest.

An agency under t he ECPA

application process can be "any local government when said government is acting in its capacity as a decision maker on an application for a substantial development permit pursuant to RC W 90.58.140.1128

If ·the permit application did not involve a substan-

tial development permit (under SMA), it appears the local government does not have a voice in determining whether or not consideration of the overall public interest warrants the need for a public hearing.

.
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plication. · "Members of the public may present t relevant views
and supporting materials in relation to any or all of the applications being considered and any SEPA related documents including
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a draft EIS. 112 9

Also representatives of the participating agen-

cies "may present agency views, information, and supporting materials which are relevant to the application under their jurisdictions. "30

The public hearing may be divided into two parts

if the hearings officer determines that the project is of a
large and complex nature.

The initial public hearing would be

heild to inform the public of the general "intent and impact of
the project 11 31; and after written comments had been submitted to
the hearings officer, a second public hearing would "inform the
public of the tentative decisions of the participating agencies."32
After the public hearing(s) the center sends copies of
the complete record to the participating agencies and requests
a final decision as determined by consultation between the center and the agency representatives.

If a public hearing is not

held, the center waits twenty days "from the date of last publication of the notice for public comment, and then forwarc(sJ the
record to participating agencies ... 33
Final decisions by the participating agencies must inelude the basis for the conclusion reached, as well as whether
they approve or deny the perrnit,and any conditions of approval.
A party desiring to review a final decision of a substantial development permit must file the request with .'. the shorelines
hearings board, within

thir~y

days.

A review of a final decision

other than the substantial development permit must be filed by ·;
the requesting party with the pollution control hearings board
within the same time limit,

A request to review final decisions
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involving both a substantial development permi t and any other
state permi t(s) will resµlt in a single staged heari ng held by
the joint boards.34

Any hearing held under ECPA by the "shore-

lines heari ngs board or t he pollution control hearings board or
by the boar ds jointly, shall be a de novo quasi-judicial hearing.1135

This means that the judgement given in the original

hearing is suspended and the de novo hearing proceeds as if the
case originated before the board.

No attention to the findings

and judgement rendered in the initial hearing is considered except as it may be helpful in the reasoning.3 6
In summary, EC PA does provide a legal framework to
coordinate and channel proposals for development through an
administrative permit system.

However, there are some major

de f ects in the master application procedure.

The developer,

not the public nor the administrative agencies, has the option
of using ECPA.

Local government should be accorded equal status

with state agencies in all proposals for development.

Thus, it

would have a voice in deciding whether or not a public hearing
should be held.

Local government seems best suited for assessing

the overall public interest concerning the specific proposal for
development under consid eration in the master application procedure.

With the current timing requirements of ECPA, the appli-

cant could proceed with the development after receiving an approval in the final dec i sion and still be subject to litigation on grounds t hat he did not fully comply with SEPA.

If

after the public hearing, or if one was not held, after proper
notice' a waiting

p~riod· - of.

siX:ty . days was initiated,· a pa:f.ty
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could not begin an action to "set aside, enjoin, review, or
otherwise challenge ,,37 the decision on the grou'nds that the
provisions of SEPA were fully complied with.
We will return to ECPA in chapter four when developing
the coordinative scheme.

But due to the optional nature of

ECPA, there is no corpus of case law associated wi th ~. this
act.

CHAPTER THREE
JUDI CIAL INTERPRETATIO N
The corpus of case law which has evolved from the implementation of SEPA and SMA provides a description of the legal
parameter of environmental manag ement in Washington.

A descip-

tion and analysis of the legal parameter will also serve to estab1 ish a guide in developing the coordinative scheme undertakenin
the next chapter.

Essentially the corpus of caselaw represents

the resolution of conflicts encompassing the actions and claims
of the major parties affected when development is channeled
through environmental law: the developer, the public, and the administrative body.
In the process of judicial interpretation, the legislative intent and the administrative guidelines formulated to carry out that intent, are given substance through the compelling

force of law.

This corpus of case law is the foundation upon

which the legal system of environmental management is built.

In

order to discern the evaluation of judicial thought, and thus,
examine how the legal system of environmental law has been constructed, it is useful to present the cases chronologically.
Generally, the facts of the case at hand are presented first,
followed by a discussion of the pertinent issues, and finally,
the opinions of the court are presented.
In a management context, two issues should be kept in

4J
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mind relating to the administration of environmental law: (1)
What evidence should be considered, and when, by the administrative agency in making its aecision? and, (2) Is that decision and subsequent administrative action, a proper exercise of its authority--is it in fact, legal?
In describing the legal ambit of environmental management issues (such as, when is a major action "significant"?),
it is necessary (besides discussing the holding of the court
and subsequent action) to discuss questions of law and questions
of fact.

The distinction between the two is not always clear,

however the Supreme Court of Washington perspective on these
questions was expressed by the Federal Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Marcus Trucking Co. 1 in which Judge Friendly quoted Professor Jaffe's definition of a finding of fact:

~·A

finding of

fact is the assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is or
will be happening independent of or anterior to any assertion
to its legal effect.'"

The Supreme Court of Washington in

referring to this distinction in ~.the Leschi 2 cases stated:
"This view has long been a part of the common law of this
state."
A comprehensive description of the legal ambit thus
includes a consideration of: findings of fact, environmental
management issues, questions of law and questions of fact, and,
the court opinion and remedy rendered by the court.
The case of Stempel v. Department of Water Resources3 is
the first one to be brought before the Supreme Court under SEPA.
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A water appropriation application was filed by the Loon Lake
Park Company, the intervenor-respondent.

When a notice of

application was published, objections were received by the
DOE including those of the respondents Stempel (and Luiten).
The protesters were concerned with numerous pollution and health
problems they foresaw as imminent if further water was withdrawn from the lake. (D. of Wat. Res. replaced by DOE, SEPA)
Regarding the application of SEPA, the DOE asserted
that whatever pollution, sanitation, sewage, or health difficulties which may arise because of the water use permit issuance, there exist other departments with legislative authority to respond to the problems.
Is a state agency required to comply with the provisions
of SEPA, if it has begun deliberation on a proposal but has not
yet reached a final decision?

Is an administrative agency ex-

empt from the procedural requirements of SEPA if other agencies
could respond to the problems

involved~

The court concluded that the department's action of apprbving a water appropriation application, was not finalized
prior to the effective date of SEPA and that the department is
obligated to incorporate certain provisions of SEPA into its
determination in this case.

The court found that the enact-

ment of SEPA declares a legislative mandate of the ecological
ethic.

The court finds that "environmental protection has

thus become a mandate to every state and local agency and department.

Consideration of environmental values is advanced

under SEPA."4

The court also states:
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We recognize SEPA does not demand any particular substantive result in gavernme:a:tal:1decision making for it
indicates "other considerations of state policy" continue to be the responsibility of the agencies. "Environmental amenities" will undoubtedly often conflict
with economic and technical considerations. In essence,
what SEPA requir.es, is that the presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values will be given appropriate consideration in decision making along with
economic and technical considerations. It is an attempt
by the people to shape tgeir future environment by deliberatiop, not default.
The court remanded the matter to the DOE for further
action in accordance with

the ~ decision.

The Stempel case underscores the intent of the legisature by ensuring that the consideration of environmental values
is the responsibility of all state and local agencies
partments.

The judicial interpretation of

SEP~'s

a~d

de-

philosophy,

"deliberation not default" provides a framework in which the
court views administrative deicsion making regarding environmental management issues.
Both SEPA and SMA are involved in Merkel v. Port of
Brownsville.6

The Port, the defendant, was engaged in the re-

development of a small boat marina along Burke Bay.

The pro-

ject consists of constructing protected moorage facilities for
recreational boasts at Brownsville on Puget Sound.

The cutting

and clearing of timber in an adjacent upland area was being carried out by the Port.

The plaintiff, Merkel, commenced action

to enjoin any further cutting and clearing of timber by the
Port until it had obtained a substantial development permit as
required by SMA.

The plaintiff further alleged the provisions

of SEPA applied because the project was a "major action sig-
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nificantly affecting the quality of the environment."
The Superior Court, the trial court, found the impact
statement filed by the Port was deficient in that the Port had
failed to consult with and obtain comments from local, state,
and federal a gencies having jurisdiction over any portion of the
project.

The court also found that the uplands development con-

stituted a "major action significantly affecting the quality of
the environment " .

The court modified an existing restraining

order by limiting its appl ication to the wetlands only, and by
removing the upland portion of the project from further restraint.
At this point, the petitioners in the case, DOE and the attorney
general, instituted the action for a writ of review and stay of
proceedings.

At issu e, was whether or not the development by the

Port was so interrelated and interdependent, that both SEPA and
SMA had to fully complied wi th.
The Court of Appeals found that the local government is
responsible for the permit system of SMA which controls development on the shorelines of the state.

The court states:

At the very least, the legislative scheme of SMA contemplates a systematic and intelligent management of
the shorelines. Emphasis is placed upon a cooperative
and unified effort by all government agencies to achieve
a use policy consistent with the provisions of the act.
It is also clear that lands adjacent to shorelines must
also be taken into consideration if the consistency
stressed in the act is to be achieved.7
It was the Port's contention that references in SMA to
lands adjacent to the shoreline constitute nothing more than an
admonition to the local government to adhere to the policies of
the act in drafting guidelines for shorelines within their juris-
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diction.

The court did not accept the Port's argument finding

that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the proposed construction was ever anything but one project.

The Port

could not disassociate the uplands from the shorelines in order
to frustrate the intent of SMA.

At issue . was whether the Port

could take a single project and divide it into segments for purposes of SEPA and SMA approval.

Separating the uplands from the

shorelines would not only frustrate the intent of SMA, but such
a segmenting would reduce the "significance" of the environmental impacts.

The court states:"The frustrating effect of

such piecemeal administrative approvals upon the vitality of
these acts compels us to move in the negative."8

To permit

piecemeal development, noted the court, would result in "frustration rather than fulfillment" of the legislative intent inherent in the acts.
The Court of Appeals held that in light of the interrelationship of effects of the proposed redevelopment upon wetlands
and upon adjacent uplands areas, the Port, once having complied
with provisions of SEPA by filing a revised EIS , was not free to
proceed cutting trees and clearing the uplands areas without regard to whether or not permits required by SMA had been issued.
The writ of review was granted and the Superior Court .. henc.e

l

was directed to reinstate the restraints previously imposed upon the clearing of the uplands area portion of the project.

This

is important in the recognition that it is the function of the
courts to ensure compliance with the procedures specified in
SEPA and SMA.

Also, the courts will not allow a development to

49

be segmented in order to frustrate the full implementation of
the acts.
In Juanita Bay Vally Community Assoc. v. City of Kirkland, 9 the Kirkland City Council approved the issuance of a
grading permit to the Kirkland Sand & Gravel Company, which
planned to convert the gravel pit, which it owned, to an industrial park.

There is a stream, 35-45 feet above the eleva-

tion of Lake Washington (shoreline of state-wide significance),
which flows across the property in question.

The

proper~y

is

located J/4 to 1 mile east of the high water mark of the surface of Lake Washington.
The Association, the plaintiff, sought to halt grading,
excavating, and filling activity pursuant to the grading permit.

The Superior Court denied their writ of mandamus and an-

cillary relief and the Association appealed.
Major issues of the case concerned both SEPA and SMA:
Are the procedural requirements of SEPA applicable to a municipal corporation, City of Kirkland?; Is an EIS required in the
issuance of a grading permit, and if so when?; Is the marshland adjacent to the stream an "associated wetland" within the
meaning of SMA, such that a permit from the proper governmental
authority must be obtained before any activity can be initiated?
Kirkland Sand & Gravel, and the City, the defendant argued that: (1) the strict procedural requirements of SEPA do not
apply to the issuance of the grading permit; or (2) if they do,
the facts as determined by the trial court make it clear an EIS
was not necessary.

The Court of Appeals notes that the EIS is
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particularly important because:
It documents the extent to which the particular agency
has complied with other procedural and substantive provisions of SEPA1 it reflects the administrati~e record;
and it is the basis upon which the responsible agency
and officials can make the balancing judgment mandated by SEPA between the benefits to be gained by the
proposed "major action" and its impact on the environment .10
Kirkland Sand & Gravel and the City contend that the act
of issuing a grading permit cannot constitute a "major action"
unless it is a legislative action involving the exercise of discretion.

The action taken by the City, the maintain, was ad-

ministrative only, involving no discretion.

They argue that the

preparation of an EIS prior to the issuance of the grading permit
would serve no useful purpose because the city council had no
discretion to deny the application for the grading permit once
the requirements established by the building department had been
met.

The court notes that the building code requires the City

building official to make numerous judgements as to the type and
extent of data to be prepared by the application.

The grading

plan, argues the Association, itself lists 11 conditions, each
of which represents an administrative judgement by the City pertaining to environmental factors.
The court noted that, although the trial court determined that the issuance of the grading permit did not constitute a "major action significantly affecting the quality of the
environment", there was no showing that the responsible branch
of state government, the City, made such a determination.

The

court agrees with the Association, in that regardless of whether
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the City characterizes its action in issuing the grading permit
as ministerial or discretionary, such characterization cannot
def eat the express mandate of the legislature requiring the
City to carry out the procedural steps of SEPA.

Thus, with the

enactment of SEPA, all formerely considered ministerial actions
become discretionary.

The court also agrees with the Associa-

tion's assertion that the grading permit and excavating project
authorized by the issuance of the permit constitutes a threshold
act in the implementation of the Company's plan for an industrial
park development.

The court held SEPA requires that an EIS be

prepared prior to the first government authorization of any part
of a project or series of project, which, when consider cumulatively, constitute a major action significantly affecting the
environment.

The court also held that SEPA is an "action for-

cing" enactment.

SEPA, in requiring the consideration of en-

vironmental values before a decision is made whether or not an
EIS must be prepared, also requires that a decision not to prepare an EIS be based upon a determination that the proposed project is not a major action.

As the court states it:

Before the court may uphold a decisi:on of whether or
not a branch of State government decides to prepare an
EIS, the appropriate governing body must be able to demonstrate that environmental factors were considered in
a manner sufficient to amount to prima facie compliance
with the procedural requirements of SEPA.11
The court remanded the cases to the City for its determination
of whether it is necessary to prepare an EIS before making a
decision on the question of whether or not to issue the Gravel
Company a grading permit.
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Regarding the Association's assertion t hat the marshland
area adjacent to the stream is an "associated wetland" within the
meaning of SMA , the court found the DOE had adopted WAC Chapter
173-22, which includes a series of maps designating "associated
wetland" throu ghout the state and which does not include the
marshland in question.

The court concluded that the trial court

had correctly determined the property in question to be outside
the scope of SMA .
In the case of Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke
Associates, Inc., Roanoke, the defendants, purchased lots in Roanoke Bay of Lake Union, which already contained a boat marina
comprising 60 covered boat moorages and a boat sales and repair
s h op.

The Roanoke applied to the City of Seattle for a build-

ing permit to construct a condominium in 1967.

This building

permit and another one were granted before SEPA became effective.
The third building permit was granted after SEPA became effective.

The plai ntiffs, Eastlake, upon the granting of the third

building permit, brought action against the developer--Roanoke-the City, and the City superintendent of buildings, to enjoin
construction of the condominium apartment on the lakeshore.
The case involves: Whether or not the granting of a
third renewal of a building permit required the preparation
of an EIS? · and, Whether Roanoke ···was required to obtain a permit required by SMA prior to undertaking their substantial
development?
Governmental agencies essentially affect the environment
in two ways.

They grant permission, a part of their regulatory
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functions, to private parties who, in turn develop projects affecting the environment.

The governmental agencies may initiate

and develop projects of their own.

The court notes that either

function may involve more than one "major action" although there
is only one

p~oject.

Each stage in a series of decision making,

if "major", would require an EIS.

The court states ·:;tl:iat .the

third renewal of the building permit was a "'major action' because it involved a discretionary and nonduplicative stage of
the building department's approval proceedings relative to an
ongoing major project."13

The court notes "The fact that the

private sector undertakes the project, but only with the approval
of the government does not diminish the 'major' impact of the
t.ion. 1114
· ·
governmen t par t 1c1pa

reached in Stempel.

Th e cour t re1. t era t es cone 1usions
'

The granting of the renewal was nonduplica-

tive because environmental issues were not considered in the
granting of the original building permit or at any subsequent
"major action".

The intervention of new information or develop-

ments since an earlier "major action" that did not consider environmental factors would make the action nonduplicative.
The EIS also provides for the consideration of the extent to which resources are "irreversably and irretrievably"
committed.

SEPA is not applicable to a project which has

reached that "critical stage" of completion foreclosing the consideration of environmental protection desired by the act.

The

project, notes the court, prior to the third permit renewal, had
not reached that critical stage because the possibility of modification or abandonment remained viable under the substantive

options available in SEPA.

"The building department should

have begun their review at SEPA's effective date or at such a
time after SEPA 's effective date that they could anticipate an
application for a permit renewal would be made .. 1).-~~ stated -, the
court.

(The question could be posited: How is one to antici-

pate an application?) The court held that the city should have
commenced environmental evaluation of the proje ct's impact
prior to the third renewal, an EIS was required.
There is no indication in the Eastlake that a factual
determination had ever been made to ascertain whether or not
the project was a "major action significantly affecting the
quallty of the environment".

Apparently when the court noted

that "other undisputed facts of the case are, no EIS has ever
been prepared on the project at any stage of governmental action
relating to the project"~ 6 they were substituting their judgement
for that of the administrative in question.

When the court found

that an EIS was required, it was treating the matter, not as a
question of fact, but as a question of law.

Yet no factual de-

termination had been made by the appropriate administratt:Y.e upon
which the court could rule.
On the question of whether or not SMA applied in this
case, the court held that construction of Roanoke Reef condominium had begun before the effective date of SMA, therefore the
project was exempt from the permit requirements of SMA.
Loveless v. Yantis 1 7 involves an appeal from an order
of county commissioners denying application for preliminary approval of a plat for a

multi ~ amily

condominium1onapenisula at

55
the sout·he.rrr

extremity of Puget Sound.

The respondant, Loveless, filed an application with the
County Planning Department for preliminary approval of his
plat.

He was denied, but no reasons were given concerning his

denial. , Loveless appealed this order to Superior Court.

The

Coopers Point Association and Water Company, requested permission
to intervene.

They were denied, but were allowed to submit briefs

and argue the merits of the case as amicus curia$. The court then
found the failure of the commissioners to provide any reason for
refusing to grant preliminary approval to the plan constituted
an "arbitrary and capricious" decision (under Administrative
Procedures Act) and granted the prelimina y approval. Yantis,
the . appellant, et al, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ
o f certiorari authorizing them to intervene.
There are two issues raised in this: (1) Whether or not
an EIS is a necessary prerequisite for preliminary approval of
the plat? and (2) Whether the intervenor-appellants are entitled
as a matter of right to intervene? (administrative procedures
issue).
The court held that the decision to grant preliminary
approval of the plat for the proposed project constitutes a
"major action" citing Eastlake and Stempel, while noting that
''no party to the appeal asserts that the prroject will not significantly affect the environment. "18 Again, there had been no factual
determination of whether the proposed project would have a
significant effect on the environment.
transversing its traditional role in

The court seems to be

Taw<, ~ _.,~

in substituting its
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judgement for that of the administrative body.

The court also

noted: "Nor is there any question but that the preliminary approval of a plat involves discreation and in this case is non
duplicative." 1 9
It was claimed by Yantis in this case that the "intervention of right" is applicable.

The court Civil Rule of Super-

ior Court applicable CR 24(a) which states:
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
The court found that each of the intervenors has the necessary
interest in the property.

The Cooper Point Association are all

residents of the area affected, and the association has a

di~

rect enough interest to challenge the administrative actions.
The court ruled, the nature of a preliminary plat establishes that it is not merely an insignificant stage of the proceeding without real consequence.

Decision made by the county,

that may have a permanent impact on the intervenors, such as the
approval of a preliminary plat, demands that they consider environmental factors.
The Supreme Court cases of Leschi Improvement Council v.
Washington State Highway Commission20 is an appeal from a judgement of the Superior Court dismissing an action to review a
state highway commission hearing relating to issues of a limited access and design of a limited access highway.

The purpose

of the hearing was to establish that a segment of Interstate
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Highway 90 which extends from the west shore of Mercer I sland to
the point where the highway will intersect I nterstate 5 in Seattle,
would be designated as a limited access facility.
Issues raised in the case included: (1) grounds for
standing under SEPA's "right to a healthful environment" clause;
(2) standards of judicial review applicable under SEPA; (J) relationship between EIS and each person's "right to a healthful environment; (4) appl ication of SEPA in conjunction with other state
statutes; (5) what questions of law are subject to review under SEPA; and, (6) the application of the doctrine of laches.
The Leschi Improvement Council, petitioners/appellants,
challenged the findings and order of the Highway Commission,
as it relates to the overall design of the highway(not related to the limited access questions}through a petition for a
writ of certiorari.

They admit they are not abutting proper-

ty owners entitled to review under RCW 47.52 (Limited Access
Facilities Act), but allege they are directly affected by noise
and noxious fumes emanating from t he motor vehicles which use
the highway.

They seek to invoke standing under SEPA.

SEPA is interpreted by the courts as having broad applicability.

Even though the proceedings in this case were

initiated under the Limited Access Facilities Act, the court
found the petitioners had standing to raise SEPA issues because "the provisions of SEPA are engrafted on the existing
statutory authorizations ... 21
This is the first case in which the Supreme Court has
interpreted environmental rights.

The grant of standing on the
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"right to a healthful environment" was made clear by the court:
The right of petitioners affected to a "healthful environment" is expressly recognized as a "fundamental
and inalienable" right by the language of SEPA. The
choice of this language in SEPA indicates the strongest
possible terms the basic importance of environmental
concerns to the people of this state.22
How expansive this grant of standing becomes in future years
remains a question.

The court in Leschi has granted a substan-

tial right based on the language inherent in "fundamental and
inalienable right to a healthful environment".

In granting

such a legal right the court has granted standing to anyone
claiming they are an "aggrieved" party under SEPA.

A person

"aggrieved" by an administrative actiqn whose legal right is
invaded has the right to review that action under the Washington
Administrative Procedures Act (APA).

A person aggrieved is one

whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of,
(Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th ed. rev. 1968)

...

II

The court has inter-

preted the legislative grant to the people to a right to a healthful environment as the grant of a legal right.

Whenever a branch

of state government makes a determination whether or not a proposal may "significantly affect the qualtiy of the environment" ,
a citizen's legal right is thus at issue.

The court reasons:

The court has the inherent power to adjudicate the
adequacy of an EIS as a question of law • • • A determination of adequacy necessarily determines the legal
rights of the parties as to the disputed project . • •
Under SEPA an agency's decision to approve a project
impliedly, if not expressly, determines that the project is consistent with the citizen's fundamental right
to a healthful environment • • • These agency conclusions,
either expressly or impliedly, are questions of law because they are not 'independent of or anterior to any
assertion as to their legal effect• 2J
0
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How all-encompassing the citizen's le gal right to a healthful
environment is, pertaining to governmental actions remains to
be further clarified by the evolution of case law.

However, it

is apparent, the Supreme Court is not reticent in its opinions
concerning the people and their environment.
The decision in Leschi contains a thoughtful presentation in response to two questions regarding judicial review:
(1) What standards of review are appropriate to a trial court
examining the record of an administrative agency before it on a
writ of certiorari? and, (2) What standards the Supreme Court
shall use to review the findings of the trial court?
The Supreme Court has said that judicial review of
findings of fact made by administrative agencies is limited to
a determination of whether the administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence and have a rational basis.24
In this case, the highway commission made no finding as to whether the EI S before it was adequate.

Such a finding if it had

been made, notes the court, would have been an application of
law to the facts before it and as such would have been reviewable by the trial ceurt ·· as ·~ a · question .:; of · 1avu(a ,new ·- sense of restraint? ).

"A determination of adequacy" found the court,

"necessarily determines the legal rights of the parties as to
the disputed project.

Courts have inherent power to adjudicate

the adequacy of an EI S as a question of law, reviewable on ap·- ··
peal." 2 5 The Administrative Procedures Act describes the scope
of judicial review.

l-.

The two standards most applied by the court

are 34.07.130(6)(e) and (f) which states that the court may remand
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the case for further proceedings because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the entire record
as submitted and the public policy contained in the act
of the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious • •
The trial court may conduct additional fact finding in
order to rule on the adequacy of an EIS or they may remand a
case holding . the administrative agency to a high standard of
articulation.26

The court ruled that "either procedure may be
employed by the reviewing court in . its discretion. 1127 The court

also expressed its view in reviewing the findings of the trial
court's examination of an administrative agency's action on a
writ of certiorari, they would not be disturbed on appeal "if
they are supported by substantial evidence. 1128
The relationship between EIS and the citizen's right to
a healthful environment is important.

The EIS is the principal

means by which the administrative agency can evaluate environmental factors in determining whether or not to approve a project.

The court ruled:
Under SEPA an agency's decision to approve a project
impliedly, if not expressly, determines that the project is consistent with the citizen's fundamental
right to a healthful environment and with the legislatively mandated policy that an agency action allow
to citizens the widest practicable ran~e of beneficial
uses of the environment without degradation.29

As has been mentioned, since the court has held that the adequacy
of an EIS is a question of law, it is reviewable by the court.
Regarding the doctrine of laches (making application for
redress of negligence in the performance of a legal duty), the
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court held that the failure to timely proceed on grounds of
violation of the provisions of the SEPA against government projects can be a bar to such suits by its application.

The court

also held that the application of the doctrine of laches is on
a case-by-case basis.
The major issue raised in the minority opinion involved
the question of standing and the subsequent grant of a legal right
to a "healthful envi:ronment" under SEPA.

If the majority opinion

holds, contends the minority, then any citizen may obtain judicial review of any administrative proceeding involving a decision
which affects him, however indirectly.

Interesting questions are

raised in t he Leschi case: What is the legal ambit of a citizen's
(environmental) standing under Washington law?

How directly must

a citizen be affected to gain standing before the court?
A SMA case, State DOE v. City of KirklandJO involves the
issuance, by the City, of a substantial development permit author- ·
izing the construction of an all-weather moorage facility on
Lake Washington by the Biltman, Sanders, Hasson Corporation.
The DOE and attorney, plaintiffs, sought a review of this matter
by the Shoreline Hearings Board.

After a review of the record

made before the Board, three membersvoted to uphold the permit,
and three members voted to modify 't he permit.

SMA requires that

four members votes are needed to approve the permit, or the decision of the local government holds.

The Supreme Court held

that the three to three vote, which had the effect of affirming
the City's (defendant) position, was a final order reviewable
by the Superior Court, even though the statute required four

t'•
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votes for adoption of a Board decision.
The court's criteria which it applied in order to determine if the administrative orders were reviewable is when: "They
impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship as consummation of the administrative process ... 31 The
tie-vote Board determination resulted in the decision of the
City standing affirmed.

As such, found the court, it met the

previously mentioned criteria and thus, rendered that decision
ripe for review.
The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of the writ of mandamus issued by the Court of Appeals.

The Superior Court was

directed to assume jurisdiction of the case and to review the
City's posit ion, as SMA requires four votes for adoption of a
Board decision.
The Supreme Court case of Narrowsview Preservation Associat~on v. City of Tacoma32 arises on an appeal from a judgement
of the Superior Court, upholding the validity of a zoning ordinance rezoning an 89 acre tract from single family dwelling to
planned residential development.

A portion of the 89 acres,

sloping down toward the Tacoma Narrows, is within 200 feet of the
Puget Sound.

Selden, one of the respondents, filed an application

to have the property rezoned to planned residential development
to allow the construction of approximately 1,100 apartment units
in 3-story structures.
The Narrowsview Preservation Association, the plaintiff,
brought a writ of certiorari before the Superior Court.

They

sought to review the actions of the planning commission of city

63
council of the City of Tacoma, the defendent, who adopted an ordinance which rezoned the

~9

acre tract.

The Superior Court

up held the validity of the amendment to the

~oning

ordinance

of the City of Tacoma.
Two issues are raised in this case: (1) Whether the Ci ty
had failed to comply with the requirements of SEPA requiring an
EIS in major a ctions significantly affecting the quality of the
environment--in particular, what constitutes..: "significant"? and
(2) Whether the City improperly failed to require a shoreline
development permit from the developer?
A question of law pertains to the interpretation of the
term "significantly" in SEPA requi·ting cities and other public
agencies to include an EIS in every major action "significantly"
affecting the environment.

Us e of the term, found the court in-

cludes examination of the extent to which the action will cause
adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing uses in an area, and absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the action itself, including cumulative harm
that results from contribution to existing adverse conditions
or uses in affected areas.

This represents a change in empha-

sis, from significant actions to adverse actions.
The planning commission had obtained comments from various affected local and state agencies concerning environmental
impact of the proposed rezoning, and held full public hearings.
Based upon evidence collected, the commission decided that the
rezoning would not have a substantially greater impact on the
area than the development of the property under its pres-ent
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zoning.

The court found that the decision was neither arbitrary

or capricious.

Therefore, an EIS was not required.

The court

found that it would not be inconsistent however, if at a later
time, when additional information was made available, the commission decided to require an EIS for any further approval for
"action'~ :

such as when application is made for approval of a

preliminary pl at or building permit.

At such times, reasoned

the court, more details of the specific structures would be forthcoming and use of the property more clearly defined.
repres~nt,

This would

in fact, a nonduplicative and discretionary decision.

The court held that the reclassification of an area to
a planned residential development does not have the effect
of authorizing construction upon the property involved: "The
act of rezoning does not involve any physical alteration of
the land or irrevocable commitment to allow such a physical
alteration. 33
11

Thus, rezoning is not within the meaning of

"development" under SMA, and a shoreline development permit
is not required.

It should be mentioned here that SEPA is

primarily concerned with governmental actions that may significantly and adversely affect the quality of the environment•
whereas, SMA focuses on the management and development of the
state's shore.lines.

Within the context of SMA, "development"

means: "a use consisting of the construction or exterior alteration of structures • • • or any project of a permanent or temporary nature which interferes with the normal public use of the
surface of the waters overlying lands subject to this chapter
at any state of water level.

11

34
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The case of Byers v. Board of Clallam County Commissioners35 arose when the County Commissioners, the defendant,
passed an interim zoning ordinance for a portion of the county.
Byers, (citizens, taxpayers) plaintiff and respondant, challenged
the ordinance by a writ of certiorari.

A subsequent hearing be-

fore the Superior Court resulted in the ordinance being held invalld.

The Board (and Planning Commission) appealed.
The respondents were granted the writ of certiorari by

the 'Supreme

Court as the court recognized it as an appropriate

remedy to test the reasonableness and validity of a zoning ordinance; and, to determine if the initial adoption of a zoning
code is a major action, requiring an EIS under SEPA, if the adoption of such a code significantly affects the environment.
The Board did not contend that the zoning ordinance was
not a "major action" (the ordinance involved, included 30 pages
of detailed zoning regulations).

Rather, they submitted that the

wor.a "action" as ·used in SEPA is synonymous with the word "pnoject".

The court disagreed, citing relevant section of SEPA

which states than an EIS is required in every "recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major action significantly affecting th~ quality .of the environment. 1136 The
court held that the adoption of a zoning ordinance is a "major
action" in that it is discretionary and nonduplicative.

The or-

der of the Superior Court holding Clallam County's interim zoning ordinance invalid, was affirmed.
Hama Hama Company v. Shorelines Hearings Boarct3? is. a
statutory interpretation case.

It involves provisions of SMA
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relating to standing and time limits for appellate review of
the granting of a substantial development permit to Hama Hama,
the plaintiff, by Mason County.

The granting of the pe rmit was

appealed to the Board by DOE and the attorney general.

The Board,

the defendant, denied motions made by Hama Hama to dismiss the
appeal.

Thereafter the Superior Court for Thurston County issued

a writ of certi orari and, subsequently, entered an order directing the Board to dismiss the appeal because: (1) the attorney general lacked standing to appeal; and (2) the DOE 's appeal was untimely.

The attorney general and DOE appealed.
The pertinent facts are as follows (dates given since

they are at issue).

On October 15, . 1973, Mason County granted

a substantial development permit to the Hama Hama Company to
construct a pier on Hood Canal.

The DOE received a copy of

the permit on October 19, 1973.

I n response, DOE and the attor-

ney general file "Request for Review" with the Board on November 29, 1973.

A copy of this request was in the possession of

Mason County officials on December 3, 1973.

At the time of is-

suance of the permit, Mason County had not yet adopted a master
program which is to serve as a guideline for the issuance of such
permits.
Essentially, the issues in question in this case are:
Whether the attorney general is a party to the appeal of the
court? Whether the attorney general or only DOE has standing to
appeal to the Board, and what is the time limit as to the DOE
and/or the attorney general for perfecting such an appeal?
And, What is the commencement date of the period for appealing
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to the Board?
The Supreme Court held that where a section of a statute
deals with an issue in a general manner and where a section of
the statute deals with the same issue in a more detailed manner,
the latter will be accorded preeminence.

Thus, while RC W 90. 5.8 -

.140 (SMA) essentially deals with the issuance of permits and only incidentally mentions appeals procedures, RCW 90.58.180 (SMA)
"is essentially dedicated to describing the appropriate procedures for appeals. 11 38

This section grants both DOE and the at-

torney general standing to appeal to the Board, and the time limit is 45 days.

The court's opinion here is in keeping with the

legislative intent of SMA which states it be "liberally construed
to give full effect to the objectives and purposes for which it
was enacted ... 39
Regarding when a document is "filed", the Court applied
the general rule that a document is "filed when it is actually
received by the proper authority • • • in the instant case. 114 0
DOE and the attorney general are within the time limits for perfecting the appeal.
The decision of the Superior Court was reversed and the
case remanded to the Superior Court for Thurston County for further proceedings consistent herewith, so held the court.
In Johnston v. Grays Harbor Coupty41 Johnston, the plaintiff, sought a writ to review the issuance of a conditional use
permit by the County, the defendant, for the construction of a
mobile home park.

A Mr.

~n theim

had applied for a condit i onal use

permit to construct and operate a mobile home park of approximately
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23 units.

The subject property consists of 8 acres in an area

zoned for general development in which mobile home parks may be
permitted as a conditonal sue.

The Board of County Adjustment

had conducted hearings, attended by the plaintiff, who opposed
the permit.

The permit was granted for 13 units, but the Board

failed to make a final finding of the potential environmental impact of the proposed project.
The Superior Court denied the writ to review, but remanded
the matter to the Board.

It found substantial evidence to sup-

port the order but· had found an environmental assessment to be
lacking.

Following the remand, an assessment of the environ-

mental impact was prepared, filed, and available for public inspection at the planning office.

The Board in a subsequent hear-

ing decided the action may be "major" under SEPA, and yet be
deemed not to significantly affect the quality of the environment.
Johnston'S .pet:i.itiun for a writ of certiorari was denied and the
appeal foll owed.
The Court of Appeals held that, while the Superior Court
found there had not been ·.:compliance with SEPA, the County Board
of Adjustment did not err in limiting discussion at the hearing
following the remand to "something new", rather than re-duscussing
previous matters.

It must be emphasized, the remand was for the

limited purpose of bringing the action into compliance with SEPA .
Th~

denial of ·the "petitiOn for writ of certiorari was

affirmed.
The Supreme Court case Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Association v. King County Counci142 involves the ap-
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proving of a preliminary plat for Norway Vista, a proposed housing development, by the King County Council, the defendant.

The

As sociation, the plaintiff, petitioned the Superior Court for a
writ of certiorari to review the decision.

The Assoication spe-

cifically challenges the Council's determination that an EIS was
not required.

The Superior Court denied the writ and the Associ-

ation appealed from the judgement.
Norway Vista, subject of the preliminary plat, consists
of 523 heavily wooded acres, located just south of the city of
Bothel.

The proposed plat plan for Norway Vista provides for

the creation of 198 lots, each with a single family dwelling.
Adjoining properties to the east and south have been developed
to an urban residential density (approx. 4 dw. units/acre).

To

the North the land had been cleared and there are scattered residences on

~

to 3 acre parcels.

The Director of the Land Use Management Division of the
County Department of Planning had determined that an EIS was not
necessary.

The County zoning and subdivision examiner recommended

approval of the preliminary plat application and concurred with
earlier determination that an EIS was not necessary.
After subsequent appeals by the Associati on and additional hearings the King County Council approved the preliminary plat.
Following this decision, the Ass ociation petitioned the Superior
Court for a writ of certiorari, asserting the Council had acted
unlawfully in approving the preliminary plat without requiring
an EIS .

The Superior Court det ermined that the Norway Vista

Plat was not a major action significantly affecting the environ-
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ment.

The court further found that

reasonably and not arbitrarily

King County had acted

or capriciously.

The Supreme Court rules that determinations of no
significant impact under SEPA , i.e. "negative threshold determinations", require a reasonably broad standard of review1 "We
b elieve that in addition "to the 'arbitrary or capricious' standard ,
the broader 'cl early erroneous' standard of review is appropriate ." 4 3
Th e court determined it was necessary, under the proper scope of
judicial review applicable to "negative threshold determinations"
made pursuant to SEPA to "consider the broad public policy promoted by that act. Briefly stated:
t he p rocedural provisions of
mental full disclosure law.
the policy of fully informed
ment bodies when undertaking
affecting the quality of the

SEPA constitute an environThe act's procedures promote
decision making by govern' major a ction significantly
environment.• 44
11

The "clearly erroneous " standard provides the court with
·a broader review than the "arbitrary or capricious" standard because it mandates a review of the entire record and all of the
evidence to support the administrative finding or decision.
The Supreme Court held that the Council's determination
that approval of the Norway Vista Plat did not require an EIS
was "clearly erroneous".

I n so holding the court found:

Gen-

erally, the procedural requirements of SEPA , which are designed
to provide full environmental information, should be invoked whenever more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment is a reasonable probability; I n addition to its magnitude,
the project will constitute a complete change in the use of the
existing areas"(which further defines the judicial interpretation
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of ''significant") •
The appeal to the Supreme Court in Swift v. Island
County45 involves a challenge to a determination made by the
planning director of Island County, the defendant, that no t·
EIS under SEPA was required for the approval of three plats and
building permits for a development known as "Seabreeze" in Keystone Harbor, Whidbey Island.

Action was brought seeking to

enjoin work on a subdivision development and an order directing
Island County to comply with the provisions of SEPA.
ior Court entered a judgement of dismissal.

The Super-

Plaintiffs, Swift

appealed.
Issues raised in the case are (1) What standard of review is appropriate when a court reviews an agency's

"th~eshG>J:d"

determination under SEPA and was that standard met? (2) Did the
county take a "piecemeal" approach to SMA and SEPA questions
presented by a single project? (J) Can agencies issue approvals
for a development without seeking assurances that SEPA has been
complied with.
The area involved is separated from the waters of Puget
Sound by a narrow strip of land, and it is an area of historical
significance as it is included in the Central Whidbey Island Historical District, which has been placed in the National Register
of Historic Sites.

The county planning commission rejected the

plat submitted by the Dillingham Development Company.

The county

commissioners overruled the planning commxssion and granted pre1 iminary

approval.
Shortly after work had begun, appellant, Swift, made a
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refuted the findings of the planning director.

Thus, the court

held that: "in light of numerous agency reports expressing

con~

cern as to the effect of development of subdivision on the environment, the county planning director's finding of 'no substantial
impact', thereby bypassing a preparation of an EIS, together with
various subsidiary findings, were clearly erroneous. u46

As to

the standards of judicial review, the writ held as it did in
Norway: "The review standards of 'clearly erroneous' • • • best
promote that policy of disclosure U> f SEP~ by not insulating
agency determination from court review by too strict a standard
of review. ,,47
The final case in chapter three, is Hayes v. Yount48,
a Supreme Court case, coming under SMA (and to a very limited
extent, SEPA).

The respondent Hayes owns approximately 90 acres

of unimproved land, which is a saltwater marsh habitat.

The en-

tire site is part of the area designated by the legislature as
"shorelines of state wide signigicance".

Surrounding land use

include three lumber mills, a boat marina and a sewage settlement basin across the slough to the north.
Hayes filed with Snohomish County his application for a
substantial development permit.

The application sought a per-

mit to operate a solid waste landfill and to continue to expand
trans-shipping capabilities and heavy industrial use.

Hayes'

publication of notice of hearing on the application described
the proposed development as a "marine industrial area".
The County determined that the project constituted a
"major action significantly affecting the qualtiy of the environ-
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ment".

An EIS was prepared pursuant to SEPA.

The planning

staff and planning commission of the County recommended denial
of the permit by Hayes.

These findings were considered and rejec-

ted by the County Commissioners who granted a permit for operation
of a solid waste landfilland .marine industrial area.
Yount (et al. , appellants .) filed a formal request for
review by the Shoreline Hearings Board.

The Board found that

the ecological impact of the proposed fil l would be insignif icant.

The Board concluded that the permit was too vague to as-

certain the extent to which the proposed use was consistent with
the policy set forth in SMA .
Hayes filed in Superior Court petition for review of the
the Hearings Board's decision.

The court granted Hayes' motion

for summary judgement, holding "certain actions of the Shoreline
Hearings Board arbitrary and capricious and concluding that as
applied to this particular set of facts the order and regulation
constitute an unconstitutional taking of property ... 49
Agency action is determined "arbitrary or capricious" if
there is no support in the record for the action which is therefore "willful and unreasoning action, in disregard of facts and
circumstances ... 5o
A question of law is the essential issue in this case:
By relying in part on "Use Activitty Guidelines for SMA: Landfill Activities", was the Shoreline Hearings Board's decision ·
to vacate the permit a proper exercise of its authority?

The

Landfill Use Guideline, WAC 17J-16-060(14)(c) states that landfills should be located away from water bodies because leachates
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from the land f ill might reach the water body, having a de l eterious
effect on the quality of the adjacent water.
The Board vacated the County grant of approval : the court
helq . (even thou gh the Board had not shown proof of harm to adjacent waters from leachates) "We decline to reverse the administrative conclusion of law with respect to WAC 17J-16-060(14)(c)."51
In commenting on the intent of SMA, when applying the
policy of SMA in its holding, the court found that the permit was
so vague it rendered virtually impossible, the court's ability
to review the consistency of the proposed project with SMA policy.

The court noted:
The policy of preference for water-dependent use reflects the legislative's careful attention to an important concept of environmentally sound based land
use planning. Encouraging uses not dependent on the
shoreline to locate in inland areas is an effective
aid in the resolution of competing demands on our
limited shorelines resources.53
This concept of encouragement is more than that, en-

couragement with the compelling force of law, is close to
coercion.

While the court held the taking issue did not ap-

ply in this case, the line between encouragement and unreasonable coercion should be continuously monitored to ensure
the rights of private property remain in balance with the
public's interest in the use of the shoreline.
As this chapter has demonstrated, the courts in Washington
are nothing, if not vigorous in tneir application of environmental
law to development initiated conflicts.

It also appears that the

court has granted the people of the state a substantive legal
right to a healthful environment, the future will tell how that
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right proceeds to be f\lrther refined by the courts.

Will it

lead to a more substantive "good faith" effort of administrative implementation?

Or will the courts begin making substantive

decisions if the administrative body merely adhers to procedural correctness in an attempt to avoid litigation?
In Eastlake, the court stated:
The particular choice ultimately arrived at, be it aban donment, alteration, or permission ~ to complete construction, is not dictated by SEPA.9 It is the evaluation of pertinent environmental factors that is mandated. 54
Footnote 6, if f\lrther pursued and expanded, would allow the
court to rule on substantive questions. thus, it would appear
to be trespassing on the jurisdictional boundaries of the administrative body if it so acteda
Though a substantive result is not dictated by SEPA.
Where advense environmental impact is indicated, the
approval of such a project may reveal an abuse of
discretion by the public agency where mitigation
or avoidance of damage was possible.55
And as we have already seen, whether or not a project may have
an adverse impact on the environment, since it affects the legal
rights of citizens to a healthf\11 environment, is a question of
law, reviewable by the court.

The legal ambit of environmental

management may indeed be all encompassing.

CHAPTER FOUR
SUGGESTED ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEME
Problems due to urbanization, population settlement, industrial development, technology advancement, and the depletion and dissipation of the state's natural resources, initiated a variety of responses from the legislature.

Among the

most important and encompassing of these responses were the
three environmental statutes which have been discussed in this
case study, SEPA, SMA, and ECPA.
SEPA is essentially an environmental, full disclosure
law.

It requires the consideration of environmental values in

all major action (governmental decision which is both discretionary and non duplicative) and SEPA requires the preparation
of an EIS when any proposal involves significant adverse impacts
on the quality of the environment.

Furthermore, the Supreme

Court of Washington has apparently granted substantive legal
rights to the people, through its interpretation of SEPA,
where the legislature declared that the people have a "fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment."

SEPA

is indeed receiving vigorous application from the courts.
The legislature recognizes in SMA that the shorelines
of the state are among its most valuable and fragile of natural
resources and that it is necessary to initiate a coordinated
planning and management program between local and state govern-

77

78
ment to ensure that development of the shorelines is cons istent with policy expressed in SMA.

The regulatory program estab-

lished under SMA was designed to encourage appropriate shoreline uses.
In ECPA, the legislature expressed the concern of people
who shane an interest in the development of the state's natural
resources.

ECPA offers three ppotential, and essential, assets

in the process of channeling development through a legal framework: interagency coordination, public participation, and increased
efficiency in processing the developer's application.
The suggested administrative scheme proposes using
ECPA 's master application procedure as the legal structure for
channeling development, and the EIS as the coordinative vehicle.
The EIS is the logical coordinative vehicle for inclusion in the administrative scheme.

The courts have determined

that the EIS is a document which reflects the procedural and substantive decisions made by the appropriate governmental agencies.
They have also found the EIS to be a primary means to coordinate
the consideration of environmental values.
The EIS would serve to bring the SMA permit process into the scheme.

In Eastlake, a renewal of a building permit for

a shorelines development, was deemed a major action, and thus,
SEPA applied.

Thus, it is clear, the provisions of SEPA over-

lay the SMA permit process.

In Leschi, the court found that

the provisions of SEPA are engrafted onto: the existing statutory authorizations .

Also regarding SEPA and the SMA permit

process, SEPA provides that any EIS "shall accompany the proposal
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through the existing agency rev i ew processes. '.'1

Therefore, a

coordinative scheme which contemplates using the EIS as the
coordinating vehicle, would also encompass the SMA permit process.
However, the legislative intent expressed in these
three statutes could be more fully realized with certain modifications.
One of the fundamental defects of ECPA is that it is an
optional procedure; whether or not the state permit system is
utilized is left to the whims of the developer.

As a beginning ,

the master application procedure should be made mandatory f or
developments with greater than local impact ·• .2 Generally, a
development with a greater than local impact is one which is
deemed to have a significant e.ffect on more than one local
governmenta:J..jurisdiction.

.,.

Those developments significantly

affecting more than one jurisdiction would be requrred to enter
the state mas ter application procedure.

This seems reasonable,

in that once it has been established more than one political
jurisdiction will reasonably and probably be a f fected, a state
public hearing will allow the a f fected partie s to express t heir
views an d to submit supporting documents.

(A party could be

requ ired to be an "aggrieved" party to gain standing before the
hearing, see p . 58 of this study.)
Trial legislation could be enacted to test this aspect
of the su ggested scheme.

An incremental approach would be use-

ful to test for defects, and on ce improvements were made, the
proce dure could be expanded to include other typ es of devel op-
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ments.

With the proper research and methodology, a category of

developments could be selected which would avoid litigation on
the grounds of denial of equal protection.
An applicant seeking a permit($) : for development which
needs a major action for its approval, would be required to
apply for a special development permit at the county permit
information of fice.

A proposal for development which, reasonably

and probably, would have a greater than local impact, would be
required to complete a master application form.

After the ap-

plicant completes and submits the necessary forms to the information office, copies are sent to the local and state agencies
which might require permits for such development, and to interested parties.
A local hearing examiner would also receive copies
of all the forms, documents, and an environmental checklist.

4

The local hearing examiner is appointed by the local legislative body.

Legislation could be enacted requiring the exam-

iner not to be a member of the legislature or the local planning
body.

The state would provide procedural and substantive train-

ing for these officials to ensure they are aware of administrative
~hd

SEPA.

procedural requirements for hearings and compliance with
The concept of the local hearing examiner is important.

The developer is assured that provisions of SEPA are being complied with, which would help to avoid future litigation, and reduce unsubstantiated challenges to delay to permit process.
the public would benefit from a fair hearing conducted by a·
properly trained official.

Also,
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Afte r the mast er application forms (with spec i a l devel opment permit applicat i on i nclude d ) have been rece i ve d by the i n fo r mation of fice, notice is given f or a local public hearing .

Parti-

cipating a gencies, local governments ( if development would have
a greater than l ocal impact) interested parties, and t he applicant are not i f ied .
The purpose of the l ocal public hearing is to: (1) De termine wheth er or not the pr oposal f or development invol ves any
s i gnifi cant adverse impacts on the qual ity of the environment ;
an d , (2 ) Determine whether or not t he development would l i kely
have a great er than local impact.

Decisions are to be wr itten,

wi th sp eci f ic findings of fact, rea soning , and conclusions as
part of the record, reviewable by the court if necessary . Decisions of the hearing examiner are appealable to Superior Court.
The hea ring be gins only after the hearing examiner and
the applicant have received deci s ions f rom the various local and
state agencies on the proposal for development (those having
jurisdiction by law or special expertise).

After conducting the

hearing and weighing the evidence presente d , if · the examiner concludes an EIS is required, a de claration of significance is i ssued.

I f the examiner decid e s that the development meets t he

"greater than local impact" test, the applicant is required to
a ppear at a state public heari ng with the draft EI S.

I f the

proposal is cons idered not to meet the "greater than local impact" test, and no party to the hearing challenges the decision,
the applicant must submit the draft EIS at the second phase of
the local hearing--the hearing is not terminated under these

82

conditions.

SEPA provisions still apply- - circulation of draft

EIS to other participating agencies, including the local government and the public.

However, the suggested administrative scheme .

would enable the local government to supervise, and have input
into the preparation of the EIS.

It should also have review

over all stages of the EIS preparation process.

This is pro-

vided by granting the local government equal status with partipating state agencies in the state hearing.
In this suggested administrative scheme, the local gove rn1

ment' s role does not conclude with the issuance of the certification form, as it does now under current provisions of ECPA's mas ter application procedure.

Making ECPA mandatory has been per-

ceived by local government as further centralization of the land
development permit process.

Under this scheme local government

retains some autonomy over the the permit process and increases
its autonomy over the EIS process.
The state hearing is required because the development
meets ~ · the

"significant adverse impacts" test and the "greater

than local impact" test.

In this case, a special development per-

mit can be granteru only after the master application forms have
been completed by the a pplicant, submitted, circulated, and the
master application procedure has been successfully negotiated.
The first phases of the state public hearing is one in
which the applicant "may submit any relevant information material
in support of hi s application.

Members of the public may pre•

sent relevant views and supporting materials in relation to any
or all of the applications being considered, and any SEPA r e-

BJ
lated documents, including a draft EI S."6
The first stage of the public hearing is recessed, not
terminated, to allow parties to bring action on grounds that
provisions of SEPA have not been complied with, or other grounds.
The hearing recess enables the applicant to evaluate and incorporate comments into the final EIS.

Provisions of ECPS's Master

Application Procedures would now apply.

Final decisions must

be appealed within thirty days unless a modification of the proposed development has been attached to the master application.
In such a case, the review period is extended thirty days.

Re-

view period commences when the master application center sends
out notification to participating agencies and interested persons.
Section 70 of the Master Application Procedures prov ides that "any aggrieved by and desiring to appeal any final
decision of a local government, issued thr ough the provisions of
this chapter, shall obtain review in the same manner which would
apply if the local government had not used the procedures of this
chapter."

An "aggrieved" party is one whose le gal rights are af-

fected by a governmental decision (seep. 58 of this study).
Since it has established in Leschi that the adequacy of an EIS
affects a person's "fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment", the "aggrieved" party standing provision in t he
Master Application Procedures allows for the active participation
of the public in the decision making process envisioned in the
su ggested administrative scheme.
Public participation in the EIS process under ECPA's
procedures has been provided for, especially at the local level.
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Interagency coordination is enhanced by using the EI S as the
coordinative vehicle and by enabling local government to comment
on, and review, the EI S at the state pulic hearing (whe r e deve l opment would have a greater than local impact).

The use of the

local hearing examiner would seem to ensure that costly delays
to the developer's application for permits would be mitigated,
resulting in a more efficient processing system,

Too, the public

would be assured of a fair hearing.
However, it is t he administrative deci s ion making body
which occupies the pivotal position in channeling development
through environmental law .
why, becomes significant.

How they make their decisions and

CHAPTER FIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE FUTURE
In channeling development through environmental law,
·the administrative decision making process (environmental management) plays a significant role in determining if, and under wha:t"'
conditions, development will be allowed to occur.

Development

signals a change in the distribution of natural resources, whether it occurs in the form of mining, the construction of homes,
or whatever.

Economic growth, especially in an economy like ou;rs,

depends upon development for its sustenance.

Development in a

purely economic sense can be considered as the opportunity to
the benefits and resources of society, as an expansion of accessibility.

Thus, there are large segments of our society de-

manding development.
On the other hand, with intensifying concern over the
depletion and dissipation of natural resources, there are groups
opposing development, and proposing order.

Such opposition to

development can be interpreted, and rightly so, .a-s the . unjust
denial of opportunity to those desiring to expand their accessibility to society's benefits and resources.
It is the task of environmental management to consider
these competing, conflictingclaims over the use of natural resources (order, -conservation,is considered a use), and to reach
conclusions concerning their allocation.
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Often the questions concerning development take on
another appearance.

Many communities are enacting growth con-

trol ordinances to restrict the movement of people coming into
the community in order to protect · thoS:e- -=i community's values
concerning quiet seclusion, aesthetic quality.

In other w.o rds,

the community desires order, not development.

Should the right

to maintain desired community values be allowed to interfere
with people's right to movement? .. Which set of competing claims
should prevail?

Can a reasonable compromise be reached?

In the early stages of the administrative function of
government, regulation was its primary responsibility.

Land,

and other natural resources, were considered too abundant to
require allocation.

But, gradually allocation became more im-

portant, until today, planning has become a predominant administrative function in ·determining who should receive the benefits of development and order, and who .should pay the costs of
development and order.

The task is not easy:

The evolution · of functions of administrative
agencies has been from regulation, to include allocation, and finally, to encompass planning. All this
has happened without a sound theory of why the evolution should go the way it has. There has been a lack
of theory to direct the development of "administrative
law" in the United States • • •
The integration of planning and allocation with the
original function of the administrative agency--regul~
tion has resulted in an absence of a body of planning
law.1
In this context, environmental management, the manifestation of the administrative decision making process in
channeling development through environmental law, should be
based on a theory of planning law.

Planning,comprising the
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process of goal stipulation, the ends to be accomplished, an d
law, the le gal means of accomplishing these goals.
Environmental management, the problems of economic
growth, and the changing role of government present serious
difficulties in determining the organizational patterns of communities, and thus, society.

These difficulties however, pre-

sent the opportunity for meaningful progress:
A fundamental use of property combined with new
methods of political participation will need to be
found, more in keeping with the need for high information and its utilization. The fact that this makes
social life a scientific problem should not deter us.
It is politics that makes science moral.2
The question of whether a theory of planning law can provide environmental management with a foundation for decision making merits further attention.

Needed is more research in the

relatinship between a theory of planning law and the distribution
of environmental amenities.
ning step on this path.

This case study represents a begin-
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